



BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH REPORT: ANTICORRUPTION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

March 2019



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“If anyone decides not to pay bribe, the work which would be finished in one day would take several days, and sometimes due to not paying bribe the service will not be delivered or might get rejected.”

MALE CITIZEN 3, FILING A COMPLAINT, KABUL

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As an organisation committed to the long-term peace and prosperity of Afghanistan, it was a privilege for Magenta to be able to carry out this behavioural research on petty corruption, an issue so critical to the Afghan people. This study opens up new avenues for us to think about addressing corruption. It explores the ways a tailored and culturally-sensitive social behavioural change based approach can induce positive changes in citizens' participation in corruption from the bottom-up.

Magenta would like to express its appreciation and gratitude to the team responsible for the production of this report. This unique research was made possible with the financial resources and vision of UNDP Afghanistan and in partnership with Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan organisation that has been committed to fighting corruption in Afghanistan since 2005. Magenta extends its appreciation to the report's primary author Elizabeth Robinson, a social behavioural change specialist at Magenta, our local data collection team, NOMA, the researcher leading on the methodology design, Sophie Mestchersky, and Jaimie Vaughan who designed the report. Magenta would like to acknowledge the Afghan government authorities for their cooperation during data collection. Finally Magenta would also like to thank Sarah-Jean Cunningham and Mary Ivancic and all other reviewers who reviewed, edited and commented on initial drafts of the report.

Magenta urges policymakers and donors to utilise this research and encourages them to consider social and behavioural change approaches to addressing systemic corruption in Afghanistan.

Anticorruption project implementation plan

LIST OF ACRONYMS

**AFN**

Afghani (currency in Afghanistan)

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GIRoA

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

FGD

Focus Group Discussion

IWA

Integrity Watch Afghanistan

MOI

Ministry of the Interior

MOJ

Ministry of Justice

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

PIP

Project Implementation Plan

SBC

Social and Behavioural Change

UN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme



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Afghanistan's **protracted instability** has given way to **high levels of corruption**, which in turn contribute to **insecurity** in a self-perpetuating cycle.¹

This widespread corruption has a severe effect on the **quality and timeliness of public service delivery** in the country, to the point where access to services is determined by the extent to which citizens engage in corruption.

To better understand why both citizens and public servants adopt corrupt behaviours in the context of public service delivery in the justice and security sectors, Magenta conducted a **Behavioural Research study** to investigate the drivers and barriers for specific behaviours related to corruption.

Among citizens, these behaviours included 1) **refusing to pay a bribe**; and 2) **reporting corruption**. Among public servants, Magenta investigated the behaviour of **soliciting a bribe**.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study examined psychological, sociological and environmental drivers and barriers, as well as other contextual factors that contribute to an environment that either enables or deters these behaviours. The research included 24 one-on-one interviews with public servants, 96 one-on-one interviews with citizens and a quantitative Barrier Analysis survey comparing citizen “doers” of the two above behaviours with “non-doers” of the behaviours. The research was conducted in Kabul and Herat in early 2019.

The research confirmed that public servants—in addition to citizens, as previously reported in Magenta’s Citizen Journey Mapping Report²—engage in extensive mental gymnastics to justify their corrupt behaviour and to convince themselves they are still fundamentally good people, despite soliciting bribes. Both citizens and public servants, to a large extent, deflected responsibility for bribery to the other party, focusing on how their counterpart contributed to the circumstances in which a bribe was paid, rather than their own contribution to that context. The truth likely lies somewhere in the middle: both citizens and public servants are responsible to some degree for the rampant petty corruption in Afghanistan, both may benefit from this practice, and neither party is prepared to fully acknowledge their responsibility in the matter.

The drivers and barriers for corruption related behaviours ranged from those that citizens and public servants had control over to those that they did not control; in some cases, respondents implied that they did not have control over certain factors, though in reality they likely did to some degree. This also confirms the above, in terms of respondents ignoring factors they do have control over and in turn focusing more on the factors that they do not control, or that are controlled by their counterparts.

The findings also suggest that doers and non-doers of “refusing to pay a bribe” are to some extent fundamentally different types of people, i.e. their differences in behaviour are primarily due to inherent personal characteristics, not solely environmental or structural constraints. Citizens who refuse to pay bribes and report corruption are concerned with the morality of their behaviours and are somewhat indifferent as to the practical consequences of their decisions, in terms of the time and effort required to access services. On the other hand, citizens who engage in corruption are more strictly focused on the here and now, and are more concerned about completing the service as quickly and efficiently as possible.

The last key finding highlights that refusing to pay a bribe and reporting corruption are not comparable behaviours in terms of how they are perceived by others and the degree to which they’re considered positive or negative. Paying a bribe is seen much more negatively than not reporting corruption, and reporting corruption is seen much more positively than refusing to pay a bribe. In addition, respondents purported to be highly critical of those who paid bribes—an actively corrupt behaviour—but far less so of those who did not report corruption, which is seen more as a neutral, passive behaviour that has neither positive nor negative consequences; those who reported corruption were regarded positively, but not overly lauded given the rarity of this behaviour and the inherent risks.

¹ “National Corruption Survey 2018.” IWA, 2018.

² Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, February 2019.


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INTRODUCTION

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Afghanistan is a country with a strong cultural sense of justice and is shaped by influences from Islam, such as good governance and the rule of law.³ Forty years of conflict, however, have left Afghans in survival mode, which is apparent in most aspects of everyday life in Afghanistan. Despite improvements in life expectancy, infant mortality, school enrolment rates and gross domestic product (GDP), poverty and unemployment rates have increased along with unprecedented levels of displacement due to conflict and natural disasters.⁴ At one time regarded as a post-conflict state, Afghanistan has recently seen civilian casualties at their highest levels since 2002, reinforcing the reality that it is a country undergoing conflict with little sign of relief.^{5,6}

Protracted instability and insecurity have given way to high levels of corruption in Afghanistan, which in turn contribute to instability and insecurity in a self-perpetuating cycle.⁷ Corruption in Afghanistan exists in both grand and petty forms, and 70.6% of Afghans report that corruption is a major problem in their daily life,⁸ with administrative corruption the most keenly felt. This includes limited and distorted access to essential public services, as well as to justice and the rule of law. According to the most recent National Corruption Survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) and the Corruption Barometer from Transparency International, the justice and security sectors are the top two most corrupt institutions in the country.



³ 'Afghanistan National Strategy for Combatting Corruption', GoIRA


⁴ 'Afghanistan Country Snapshot: Overview', The World Bank, October 2017

⁵ 'Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan', General Assembly Security Council, August 2017

⁶ At the time of this writing, in February 2019, peace talks are underway between the Taliban and international actors, though the result is still highly uncertain.

⁷ 'National Corruption Survey 2018.' IWA, 2018.

⁸ The Asia Foundation, "A Survey of the Afghan People," 2018.



This widespread corruption has a severe effect on the quality and timeliness of public service delivery in Afghanistan, to the point where access to state resources and services is now determined by citizens' ability and willingness to pay bribes. To better understand this challenge and how to address it, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a Project Initiation Plan (PIP) for Anti-Corruption: "Development Plan for a Nation-Wide Anti-Corruption Project."

The PIP is an instrument for UNDP to initiate programmatic engagement on anti-corruption, while developing a multi-year Anti-Corruption Project.

1

Evidence-base established to inform UNDP's anti-corruption programming in Afghanistan in the security and justice sectors

2

Implementation strategies developed for prioritized anti-corruption measures with a focus on supporting the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy in consultation with relevant stakeholders

3

Advocacy, public-outreach and awareness-raising campaigns developed and implemented in target areas

OBJECTIVE 1:**Identify touchpoints for corruption**

i.e. parts of the service provision process where citizens are most vulnerable to corruption.


OBJECTIVE 2:**Better understand citizens' personal experience**

of corruption during service provision in the security and justice sectors.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & QUESTIONS 

Working under the first output—and in collaboration with IWA and UNDP's partner Think Clarity—Magenta undertook a research study from October 2018 – February 2019 to better understand Afghan citizens' experiences of government service provision in the justice and security sectors, and specifically their experience with corruption. The specific objectives of the research study are summarized on the left.

Following a literature review and stakeholder consultations (the full methodology for the research is detailed in the next section), Magenta developed several research questions to be examined through the study:



HYPOTHESES

To conduct a structured investigation into these research questions, Magenta established five hypotheses to be tested during the research process:

1. Afghan citizens engage in corruption because the benefits of doing so (in terms of more efficient service provision for citizens) outweigh the costs (in terms of financial cost for citizens, and the consequences of social sanctions).
2. Citizens have low self-efficacy to resist corruption, due to lack of information about their rights and “correct” service provision, and the perception that complaint mechanisms are non-functional or could lead to retribution.
3. Small bribes under a certain threshold and certain types of specific behaviours (such as mild forms of nepotism) are not considered corruption by Afghans.
4. Afghans are aware of what corruption is and recognize that it is a problem, but the fact that they engage in corruption nevertheless indicates that there are psychological and sociological factors at play.
5. Most citizens are not aware of the correct service process for most government services in the security and justice sectors.

In sum, we hypothesized that **Afghans tolerate corruption because they benefit from it, because they don’t have the self-efficacy (in terms of information and mindset) needed to resist corruption even if they wanted to and because there are no social sanctions currently in place to stigmatize corruption.**

In order to test these hypotheses and answer the research questions, Magenta conducted a **behavioural research study that examined barriers and drivers affecting citizens’ decisions to engage in two behaviours related to petty corruption in the security and justice sectors.**

The two selected behaviours were as follows:

1

Refusing to pay a bribe;

2

Reporting corruption. The study took an in-depth look into why some Afghans are “doers” of these behaviours—i.e. they do the behaviours—and why others are “non-doers” these behaviours—i.e. they do not do the behaviours. In addition, the research included an initial examination of one public servant behaviour, soliciting a bribe, though in light of the small sample size (24 respondents) further research is needed to confirm the preliminary findings for this behaviour. The methodology for each phase is explained in more detail below.



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METHODOLOGY

The behavioural research consisted of three phases:

- (1) literature review and stakeholder consultations to develop the research hypotheses and research questions, and to select the two behaviours included in the study;
- (2) a quantitative Barrier Analysis with citizens;
- (3) qualitative interviews with citizens and public servants (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Summary of Research Phases

LITERATURE REVIEW & STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

To better understand corruption in the context of Afghanistan, Magenta consulted relevant literature from the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including IWA, academic papers, social and behavioural change (SBC) models and case studies from other countries. Concurrently, Magenta consulted with key stakeholders and Afghan and international subject matter experts to identify the most important dynamics vis-à-vis corruption to be examined further in the research process.

Following this review and consultations, Magenta developed the hypotheses to be tested and research questions, as well as selected the two citizen behaviours to be investigated in the study. As per the methodology for the quantitative Barrier Analysis, the citizen behaviours were selected based on the following criteria:⁹ In addition, as mentioned above, the following public servant behaviour was selected for the study:

- The behaviours have direct, significant impact on eliminating petty corruption.
- The barriers to practicing the behaviours are unclear.
- The behaviours are those which stakeholders can influence on a larger scale to address petty corruption.
- The behaviours are practiced by citizens in line with the focus on addressing petty corruption.

As such, the following two citizen behaviours were selected for the study:

1

Refusing to pay a bribe:

This behaviour is at the crux of local anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan, i.e. citizens' refusal to acquiesce to pay bribes to facilitate service provision. While this is not the only mechanism by which corruption occurs—public servants play a key role in soliciting bribes (which was also examined), and in many cases citizens initiate the exchange of a bribe—this behaviour represents a potential point of intervention for anti-corruption activities. As per the methodology for the quantitative part of the study, behaviours must be a positive action to be encouraged; as such, this behaviour is focused on the refusal to pay a bribe. For this behaviour, doers are those who refuse to pay a bribe; non-doers are those who do not refuse to pay a bribe, i.e. those who pay a bribe.

2

Reporting corruption:

Citizens' reporting of corruption through official mechanisms is a key facet of anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan. Successful reporting of instances of corruption—leading to appropriate repercussions for the offending party—would create concrete sanctions against corruption and deter both citizens and service providers from engaging in corruption. For this behaviour, doers are those who report corruption; non-doers are those who do not report corruption.

⁹ PIN, Behaviour Change Toolkit. May 2017.

Soliciting a bribe:

The main mechanism by which public servants engage in corruption is by soliciting a bribe from citizens. However, it is acknowledged that nepotism and citizen-driven bribery also does play a role in contributing to petty corruption. As this behaviour was not included in the quantitative survey, the criteria of framing the behaviour in terms of what should be encouraged was not applied in this case.

QUANTITATIVE BARRIER ANALYSIS

Methodology

For the quantitative component of the study a Barrier Analysis methodology was used. A Barrier Analysis (BA) seeks to highlight the drivers that contribute to some people's (doers) decision to engage in a certain behaviour, and the barriers that hinder others (non-doers) from engaging in that same behaviour. In turn, the Barrier Analysis focuses on those qualities or responses of participants that are considered to be statistically significantly different between doers and non-doers. A statistically significant difference exists if both of the following conditions are met:

1

there is a difference of at least 15 percentage points between the prevalence of a barrier/driver between doers and non-doers

2

the p-value (probability value) is less than or equal to 0.10.¹⁰

A p-value of less than 0.10 means that the difference between doers and non-doers is probably not due to chance,¹¹ and that instead it is a statistically-significant or "real" difference; if the p-value is greater than 0.10, the barrier/driver is ignored, as it is considered too likely (according to standard statistical practice) that the difference could be due to chance. However, a p-value is not possible to calculate when 0% of either doers or non-doers mentioned a particular barrier/driver; in such cases, a higher cut-off of 20% is used for the first condition.

¹⁰ The original Barrier Analysis methodology developed by People in Need (PIN) suggests a p-value of 0.05. However, a higher p-value (i.e. lower bar for statistical significance) is permitted if the sample sizes are small, which was the case for this study. The implication of this higher p-value is discussed below.

¹¹ More precisely, a p-value of 0.10 means that there is a 10% chance that the findings are the result of random chance, as opposed to the result of meaningful differences in the samples being compared (doers and non-doers).

In addition to these two conditions, common sense was used during the analysis to determine whether a factor was a relevant barrier or driver. In some cases, the two above conditions were met, but due to small sample sizes, or the fact that a majority of doers and non-doers had selected a given response, the results were not considered reliable. Furthermore, the way the results are expressed in the standard BA analysis template—i.e. by calculating a numerical value for the relative likelihood of a doer providing that response relative to a non-doer, or vice versa—can provide a false sense of certainty and simplicity in a complex and nuanced context. In turn, only the BA findings that are statistically significant and align with common sense are reported below. In all cases, the BA findings have also been triangulated with the results of the qualitative study, and have been sense-checked by comparing the general narrative of the results with the findings from Magenta's Citizen Journey Mapping Report.¹²

In order for the BA analysis methodology to be applied, a minimum sample of 40 doers and 40 non-doers should be interviewed for each of the two behaviours, including for any disaggregations of the sample for which the analysis is conducted. It is important to note that as a result of this parameter, the Barrier Analysis results are not representative of the population, and are in fact not intended to be representative. For example, it is much more likely that an Afghan will not report corruption than report it, but these population-level statistics are not reflected in this sample of this study.

Due to several limitations, the Barrier Analysis methodology could not be used for every question in the survey. In this case, a more standard comparison of response rates was used to analyse the data.

Survey Design and Data Collection

The Barrier Analysis survey included questions that investigated different types of potential barriers and drivers related to the two selected behaviours. These included:

- Factors related to **self-efficacy**, i.e. whether the respondent felt they could do the behaviour;
- **Positive and negative consequences** of engaging in the behaviour;
- **Social norms** related to the behaviour, such as who in the community would approve of the behaviour;
- Intended **future behaviour**, i.e. whether the respondent would do the behaviour again;
- **Perceptions of corruption**, such as whether the respondent believed that corruption is a problem in Afghanistan;
- Beliefs on how to **fight corruption**, including whether citizens should do anything to fight corruption.

However, only findings that were statistically significant are mentioned in the results sections below; in many cases, these factors were not relevant drivers or barriers for the behaviours.

The survey questionnaire was tested several times throughout the development process with enumerators and other staff from the data collection agency. Several changes were made after each round of testing to ensure that the survey was easy to conduct and straightforward for the enumerators.

Respondents were identified through snowball sampling, using the personal and professional contacts of the data collection team as a starting point. Given the nature of the topic at hand and the behaviours selected, it was determined that if a respondent had ever refused to pay a bribe, they were considered a doer for

¹² Citizen Journey Mapping Report, Magenta Consulting, February 2019.

this behaviour; if a respondent had never refused to pay a bribe, they were considered a non-doer for this behaviour. Similarly, if a respondent had ever reported corruption, they were considered a doer for this behaviour; if a respondent had never reported corruption, they were considered a non-doer for this behaviour. As it is possible for citizens to sometimes be doers and sometimes be non-doers—e.g. sometimes they may refuse to pay a bribe while other times they decide to pay the bribe—doers were prompted to only consider the times when they engaged in the behaviour when answering the survey questions. The obvious draw-backs of this approach are clear, but given the near impossibility of finding respondents who had always refused to pay a bribe or always reported corruption, this was the best possible option.

Respondents were tagged as a doer or non-doer at the start of the survey based on their response to a specific set of questions. Doers and non-doers received similar but slightly different versions of the main questions in the survey; for example, questions for doers asked about what they had done in the past, while questions to non-doers were phrased in terms of what they would have done. Additional, more general questions, were also asked to both doers and non-doers regarding topics such as their media use, and life priorities.

Analysis

After the data collection was completed, the data set was cleaned and the “other” responses were translated and coded when relevant. The data was then sorted in pivot tables in Microsoft Excel and entered manually into a pre-set analysis template specifically designed for this type of study.¹³ The template includes formulas that automatically determine whether a pattern of responses meets the two criteria mentioned above to identify significant findings. In addition to this automated analysis, as mentioned above an extra sense-check was applied to the findings to ensure they were relevant.

The results were disaggregated by province (Kabul/Herat), location (urban/rural), and gender (male/female); however, due to the small sample size within some of these disaggregations (i.e., fewer than the required 40 doers and 40 non-doers), there were some cases in which the Barrier Analysis methodology could not be used to analyse the findings. In these cases, a more standard tabulation of the responses was used instead. The analysis was conducted by Magenta’s M&E and Research expert and members of the SBC Program Team.

¹³ The analysis template was developed by PIN as part of their Behaviour Change Toolkit (2017).

Overview of the Sample

Demographic Characteristics

The quantitative research comprised 176 surveys conducted between January 8th and January 16th, 2019. The surveys were split between Herat and Kabul, with 96 in the former and 80 in the latter. More men (100) than women (76) were surveyed; the least represented group was women in Kabul (32), and the most represented group was men in Herat (52) (Figure 2). To facilitate the disaggregation of data by gender and location, it had initially been planned to survey an equal number of men and women, and an equal number of respondents in Herat and Kabul. However, given the difficulty of finding doers in general, an even breakdown was not possible.

The data collection was intended to be conducted in both urban and rural locations, though it was not possible to confirm whether the urban/rural divide was fully adhered to. In turn, the data is not disaggregated by urban/rural in the following analysis. However, such a disaggregation was not initially planned as a key aspect of the analysis. More detail on this is included in the Challenges and Limitations section.

Respondents' age ranged from 19 years to 60 years, with 64% of the sample falling between the ages of 20 – 28 years. This broadly reflects the demographic reality of Afghanistan, where there is a high proportion of young people. Nearly half of the sample was married, with 42% reporting being single. Sixty-two percent of respondents reported their ethnicity as Tajik, followed by 24% as Pashtun, and 8% as Hazara; 5% reported another ethnicity (Figure 3). This is somewhat misaligned with national statistics in Afghanistan, which estimate that a plurality of the population is Pashtun, followed by Tajiks (Figure 4);¹⁴ this discrepancy is not expected to have affected the findings. As snowball sampling was used to

identify respondents, it is possible that the data collection team was largely Tajik, which could have led to them being more likely to reach out to other Tajiks as potential respondents.




Figure 2. Number of Survey Respondents by Gender and Province




Figure 3. Ethnic Breakdown of Sample

¹⁴ Afghan Ethnic Groups: A Brief Investigation. Civil-Military Fusion Centre. August 2011. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CFC_Afg_Monthly_Ethnic_Groups_Aug2011%20v1.pdf



The vast majority of the sample—nearly 90%—reported that they could read and write, including 95% of the women surveyed and 86% of the men surveyed. These reported literacy rates are far higher than the 31% of Afghans (including 17% of women) who can read and write nation-wide, and even higher than the 68% of men who are literate in Kabul (the highest rate in the country).¹⁵ It is possible that some respondents did not answer this question truthfully, and literacy was not tested elsewhere in the questionnaire. Snowball sampling may also explain some of the difference. Despite these partial explanations, it should be assumed that the sample was more literate than the general population. In turn, an important consequence is that the sample for the Barrier Analysis was likely much more educated than the average Afghan, which could have repercussions for the type of barriers and drivers experienced by respondents.

Finally, the vast majority of respondents (98%) reported that they have electricity in their households, which—in line with the above—suggests that the sample is wealthier and more urban than the average Afghan.




Figure 4. Ethnic Breakdown of Afghanistan

¹⁵ Enhancement of Literacy in Afghanistan (ELA) Programme, UNESCO, 2017. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/kabul/education/youth-and-adult-education/enhancement-of-literacy-in-afghanistan-iii/>

Respondents' Experience Accessing Government Services

All respondents confirmed that they had visited a government office to access services within the past 18 months; this was expected, as this was a pre-requisite confirmed by the data collection team before finalizing the list of survey participants. Obtaining a passport was the most common service that respondents had sought out, though obtaining a Tazkera was also common; for this question, respondents could select multiple answers (Figure 5).

All respondents also affirmed that they had experienced corruption when accessing these services, with the majority noting that they had experienced corruption and were asked to pay a bribe "a few times" (Figure 6).

These results are in line with other available reports that confirm the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan.




Figure 5. Government Services Accessed by Respondents




Figure 6. Respondents' Experience of Corruption

Doers and Non-Doers

As per the Barrier Analysis methodology, the data collection team aimed to identify an equal number of doers and non-doers. Ideally, the sample would have also featured an even breakdown of doers and non-doers by gender and province. However, as mentioned above, this was not always possible due to the difficulty of simply finding enough doers to facilitate the analysis. For behaviour 1 (refusing to pay a bribe), a total of 90 doers and 86 non-doers were identified. Among doers, 58% were men and 57% were in Herat; among non-doers, 56% were men and 52% were in Herat (Figure 7).

For behaviour 2 (reporting corruption), the sample was more skewed towards non-doers, with 120 non-doers and 56 doers identified. Among doers, 64% were men and 75% were in Herat. Among non-doers, 53% were men and 45% were in Herat. Of particular note, only one female doer was surveyed in Kabul (Figure 8).

For behaviour 2 (reporting corruption), the sample was more skewed towards non-doers, with 120 non-doers and 56 doers identified. Among doers, 64% were men and 75% were in Herat. Among non-doers, 53% were men and 45% were in Herat. Of particular note, only one female doer was surveyed in Kabul (Figure 8).




Figure 7. Breakdown of Sample for Behaviour 1 (Number of Respondents)




Figure 8. Breakdown of Sample for Behaviour 2 (Number of Respondents)

In the context of the Barrier Analysis, it is also useful to examine the overlap between doers and non-doers for behaviour 1 and 2 (each respondent was coded as either a doer or non-doers for behaviour 1, AND as either a doer or non-doer for behaviour 2). As shown in Table 1, while behaviour 2 is skewed towards non-doers, this cohort is split roughly equally between doers and non-doers of behaviour 1 (61 respondents vs 59 respondents).

		Behaviour 1 (Refusing to Pay a Bribe)		
		Doers	Non-Doers	Total
Behaviour 2 (Reporting Corruption)	Doers	29	27	56
	Non-Doers	61	59	120
TOTAL		90	86	176

Table 1. Cross-Tab of Doers and Non-Doers for Behaviour 1 and 2

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Methodology

The qualitative component of this research was designed to complement the quantitative Barrier Analysis, particularly in light of the highly nuanced and personal nature of corruption. Magenta conducted one-on-one interviews with 96 citizens and 24 public servants in Kabul and Herat. All citizens had recently completed one of six pre-selected service pathways, and all public servants had experience working in at least one of these service pathways, previously or currently. The six pathways—selected given their connection to the security and justice sections in the country and based on the literature review and key stakeholder consultations—were as follows:

- 1 Obtaining a Tazkera
- 2 Obtaining a Passport
- 3 Obtaining a Driver's License
- 4 Obtaining a Marriage Certificate
- 5 Obtaining a Land Deed
- 5 Filing a complaint with the police and receiving a judgement from the courts

Survey Design and Data Collection

The survey questionnaire for citizens aimed to capture similar information as the quantitative Barrier Analysis—mainly barriers and drivers for the two target behaviours. The interviews with public servants took a slightly broader approach, by examining public servants' broader perspectives of and experiences with corruption, in addition to the barriers and drivers of the selected behaviour. As the sample was unrepresentative in size for these interviews—only 24 respondents—these findings should not be considered externally valid for all Afghans. The survey questionnaire for citizens and public servants can be found in Annex 1.

Respondents for these qualitative interviews were selected through snowball sampling, starting with the personal and professional networks of the data collection team. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the questions asked to public servants—which included questions on the nature of corruption in their professions—former public servants were selected for the interviews when possible to mitigate the risk that respondents would not feel comfortable answering honestly.

The interviews were conducted in January 2019 in Kabul and Herat by a team of trained enumerators. The interviews were conducted in Dari, the most common local language in the target areas.

Analysis

The translated transcripts of the 120 interviews were analysed using the qualitative analysis software Nvivo. Nvivo allows the user to create a set of tags unique to each project, and then code the data according to the tags (Figure 9). For the analysis of citizens' interviews, some of the tags included "Acceptable forms of corruption," and "Drivers of paying a bribe." For the analysis of public servants' interviews, some of the tags included "Advantages of soliciting a bribe," and "Norms among service providers." These tags were applied to quotations from the FGD transcripts as relevant to organize the information and facilitate analysis. While Nvivo provides a structure for tagging and sorting information, decisions about what to tag, and with which tags, are made by the user.




Figure 9. Screenshot of Nvivo

Overview of the Sample

The breakdown of participants by gender, service pathway and location is outlined below for citizens in Table 2 and for public servants in Table 3. As it is very rare for women to go through the process of obtaining a land deed and filing a complaint, only men were interviewed for these processes. Similarly, as public servants in Afghanistan are almost always men, all public servants who were interviewed were men.

	KABUL		HERAT	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Obtaining a Tazkera	4	4	4	4
Obtaining a Passport	4	4	4	4
Obtaining a Driver's License	4	4	4	4
Obtaining a Marriage Certificate	4	4	4	4
Obtaining a Land Deed	8	0	8	0
Filing a complaint with the police and receiving a judgement from the courts	8	0	8	0
TOTAL	96			

Table 2. Breakdown of Citizen Interview Participants

	KABUL	HERAT
Obtaining a Tazkera	2	2
Obtaining a Driver's License	2	2
Obtaining a Marriage Certificate	2	2
Obtaining a Land Deed	2	2
Filing a complaint with the police and receiving a judgement from the courts	2	2
TOTAL	24	

Table 3. Breakdown of Public Servant Interview Participants



Anticorruption project implementation plan

KEY FINDINGS: CITIZENS AND PETTY CORRUPTION

INTRODUCTION: CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

General Perceptions

In line with the literature on corruption in Afghanistan, citizens in this sample largely agreed that corruption is damaging and has negative effects on communities and the country as a whole. The tone of these remarks was one of resignation and disappointment, with many respondents acknowledging that corruption “is a tragedy in our country”¹⁶ and that “corruption has destroyed the society and nowadays most of the population is part of this act.”¹⁷

Many citizens also spoke of corruption in moral terms: “Instead of making money from bribes you have (sic) think about your future and that you are collecting sins, being involved in corruption is not something to be proud of; the brave man can work harder to make Halal money.”¹⁸ Along the same lines, non-corrupt people were regarded as “having a good reputation in the community.”¹⁹ Citizens also mentioned that corruption was not in line with Islamic values, emphasizing that real Muslims don't engage in corruption: “They are very bad people and they are not Muslim, it causes more problem to the society.”²⁰ At the same time, many citizens admitted that corruption has become the norm, and that acquiescing in corruption is necessary if one is to complete certain government services: “Everyone is accustomed to corruption, if there is

no bribery no work will get done.”²¹ Some respondents also pointed out that corruption is used by the wealthy to access services faster.



“Everyone is accustomed to corruption, if there is no bribery no work will get done.”

MALE CITIZEN 3, FILING A COMPLAINT, HERAT

Indeed, citizens expressed contradictory perspectives on corruption, both claiming that corruption was a horrible act but also admitting that sometimes they participated out of apparent necessity. While most citizens did not acknowledge this contradiction directly and instead either ignored the dissonance or tried to justify it, a few respondents openly noted the paradox: “I will pay a bribe when I fully know that employees will not process my work, although I know that paying bribe is not a good habit and it greases the wheel of corruption.”²² Another respondent admitted that “the bribe taker and bribe payer are [both] sinful,”²³ representing a rare admission of guilt among citizens.



“I will pay a bribe when I fully know that employees will not process my work, although I know that paying bribe is not a good habit and it greases the wheel of corruption.”

FEMALE CITIZEN 1, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, HERAT

¹⁶ Citizen interview, Filing a complaint, Kabul, Male, 10.

¹⁷ Citizen interview, Filing a complaint, Kabul, Male, 5.

¹⁸ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 7.

¹⁹ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 4.

²⁰ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Female 4.

²¹ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 3.

²² Citizen interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Female 1.

²³ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Female 4.

Perceptions of Acceptable Forms of Corruption
Despite citizens' admission that corruption was sinful and damaging, many respondents did point out specific circumstances in which it would be acceptable to pay a bribe. This included small bribes up to a few hundred Afghanis or phone credit, especially when the small bribe facilitated the service delivery. Several citizens specifically mentioned that this type of bribery was okay since no one was harmed by it; indeed, bribery can sometimes facilitate a win-win situation. Others mentioned that corruption would be acceptable if it served to expedite the service process.

One citizen discussed why she believed that nepotism could be acceptable in some situations: "If there is a sick person standing in the queue and they are not able to wait more, despite having the option to use nepotism they are behind me and wait in the queue. I believe they should go ahead and process their work and I will be the first person to give them my turn."²⁴ While this is a very specific situation, it serves as an important reminder of the nuance of these situations, and that legal and policy frameworks are only one set of rules that influence human behaviour.

Another respondent demonstrated uniquely high self-awareness about his own internal logic of what is considered "acceptable" corruption: "I gave a bribe for a reason and to an extent it is acceptable for me to give bribe which is 500 – 1000 AFN. It is counted as petty corruption, however I agree it is not a good reason to justify my action."²⁵ This citizen is aware that he is justifying his behaviour to himself, but that the justification isn't sound. As mentioned above, the vast majority of citizens did not acknowledge the inherent contradiction in claiming to oppose corruption, but paying bribes nevertheless. For example, one citizen directly contradicted himself within two sentences, without explicitly acknowledging this contradiction: "Yeah there

are some types of bribe which are acceptable to us with paying less money. But totally giving bribe is a bad action and it is forbidden in our religion Islam."²⁶

While widespread understanding of corruption as a serious and malignant problem is a necessary first step towards addressing it, this narrative around corruption can be equally detrimental as it perpetuates feelings of hopelessness. Current narratives about corruption may be reinforcing the idea that the problem has grown too large to tackle and therefore decreasing individuals' willingness to participate in combative measures such as reporting.

²⁴ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Female 4.

²⁵ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 5.

²⁶ Citizen Interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 3.

REFUSING TO PAY A BRIBE

Drivers of Refusing to Pay a Bribe

Most of the citizens interviewed described bribe payment as necessary for receiving public services; however, almost all of those interviewed cited specific circumstances under which they would be able to resist corruption. Citizens noted the following as situations where they could and would refuse paying a bribe:

- **Having sufficient time:** Given that one of the main and most frequent consequences of not paying a bribe is stalled or suspended work on that individual's request, most citizens cited having extra time as a key factor in being able to resist corruption: "I will not pay a bribe when I am free and have more time to process the works by myself."²⁷
- **Having enough information about the process, and knowing what it should cost:** Those who were successfully able to refuse to pay bribes cited having information about how the process is legally supposed to work as a primary reason for their confidence in being able to resist requests for bribes: "When I have information about the process, I would not pay a bribe."²⁸ This driver was also mentioned by doers across all four disaggregations in the Barrier Analysis, who reported that this factor enabled them to refuse to pay a bribe. Doers were between 1.9 and 2.9 times more likely than non-doers to cite this factor.
- **Not being able to afford the bribe:** Many citizens reported that they simply did not have the financial means to pay the bribe, and as a result did not have a choice but to refuse paying the bribe: "I didn't pay since my shop was robbed and I faced loss, and I wasn't able to pay any extra money."²⁹ This, however, often meant that the services were

unnecessarily postponed. While technically a driver of refusing to pay a bribe, in reality this is simply another constraint within which citizens are forced to make decisions about their behaviour.

- **Using nepotism instead:** Using connections through family or friends is recognised as a more acceptable form of corruption and a frequent way to bypass paying bribes: "When there are personnel linkages/ I know someone in the related office, the work will get done accordingly, and a bribe won't be needed."³⁰ Again, while technically a driver of refusing to pay a bribe, this is simply another form of corruption.
- **Strong convictions against bribe paying:** Many citizens cited a moral and religious obligation to not participate in corruption as the basis for refusing to pay bribes. One respondent firmly noted that Afghans should not have to pay bribes because they are entitled to receiving services by nature of being a citizen: "Under no circumstances I am ready to pay, because I am strictly against this. We pay taxes and in exchange of all those taxes the government employees take salaries and they are obliged to give services in exchange of their salary. So for this we have already paid the price for the service and we are not obliged to pay more money illegally."³¹ This factor was also found to be relevant in the Barrier Analysis, and specifically for male doers and doers in Herat; in both cases, doers were around 2.5 times more likely than non-doers to give this answer. Furthermore, male doers mentioned that advantages to refusing to pay a bribe included feeling proud to resist corruption and feeling like a good Muslim; doers in Kabul also agreed on the second point.

²⁷ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 6.

²⁸ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 9.

²⁹ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 9.

³⁰ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 6.

³¹ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Passport, Herat, 2.

- **A normal work process:** Citizens cited a “normal” process as a reason they would not pay a bribe: “When I am sure that the work can be processed accordingly and no one will make problems for me, then I would not pay any bribe.”³² A “normal” work process likely refers to processes in which both citizens and public servants adhere to the proper process, i.e. citizens not requesting any special treatment, such as expediting their documentation, and public servants not impeding the process in any way.



“When I am sure that the work can be processed accordingly and no one will make problems for me, then I would not pay any bribe.”

MALE CITIZEN 7, FILING A COMPLAINT, HERAT

- **Self-efficacy:** The Barrier Analysis confirmed that doers of this behaviour—including both men and women, and respondents in Herat and Kabul—felt substantially more self-efficacy than non-doers, indicating that feeling capable of refusing to pay a bribe is a key driver of actually doing so (Table 4).

When non-doers in the Barrier Analysis were asked what would have contributed to their decision to refuse to pay a bribe, if they hypothetically had made that choice, they did not mention either of the factors that doers mentioned (having enough information about the process, and strong convictions against bribe paying). Instead, non-doers (both male and female, when disaggregated by gender, but neither those in Herat nor Kabul, when disaggregated by province) mentioned that they would have refused to pay a bribe if they thought they would still be able to access the service even without the bribe. In particular, male non-doers were 20.1 times more likely to mention this factor than male doers. In addition, male non-doers and those in Herat responded that they thought saving money would be an advantage of refusing to pay a bribe, which was not relevant for doers. While these factors—still being able to access the service despite refusing to pay a bribe, and saving money—cannot fully be considered drivers of the behaviour since they were reported by non-doers instead of doers, it is still highly important to acknowledge this difference in attitude between doers and non-doers.

	KABUL	HERAT	FEMALE	MALE
Doers	8.1 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	11.6 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	2.9 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	12.3 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe

Table 4. Self-Efficacy for Refusing to Pay a Bribe (Doers, in Comparison to Non-Doers)

³² Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 7.

Barriers to Refusing to Pay a Bribe

Citizens cited several factors that made it difficult to refuse to pay a bribe. In many cases, these factors were the reverse of the drivers of this behaviour. Such instances confirm the relevance of the driver/barrier. The main barriers mentioned are as follows:



"If anyone decides not to pay bribe, the work which would be finished in one day would take several days, and sometimes due to not paying bribe the service will not be delivered or might get rejected."

MALE CITIZEN 3, FILING A COMPLAINT, KABUL

- **Public servants will either not complete or delay the work without a bribe:** most of the service pathways included in this research were for documentation that citizens required, so if the work was postponed or put on hold, they often had no choice but to pay: "Without paying a bribe in government offices it's impossible to process the work, if no bribe is paid the work not get done or if it gets done 1 hour of processing will take 20 days."³³ Citizens' also noted that one of the disadvantages of not paying a bribe would be a delay in the service, or the service not being completed at all: "If anyone decides not to pay (sic) bribe, the work which would be finished in one day would take several days, and sometimes due to not paying bribe the service will not be delivered or might get rejected."³⁴ One respondent explained that after she refused to pay a bribe, the public servant kept "calling from several numbers just to create problems for me." This was likely a form of sexual harassment, even though the woman went to the office to try to process her marriage certificate—a fact would have presumably deterred any potential harassers.³⁵
- **Time constraints:** Similarly, if citizens were under tight time constraints and needed their documents quickly, they were more willing to pay a bribe: "If I lack time, I will pay bribe, because when I pay my work is processed fast, so why shouldn't I do something convenient rather than waiting?"³⁷ All disaggregations of non-doers in the Barrier Analysis confirmed that "wanting to access the service as quickly and as easily as possible" contributed to their decision to pay a bribe. Non-doers were between 2.4 and 4.4 times more likely than doers to give this response.
- **Lack of information about the process and timeline:** Reflecting the above-mentioned driver of having information about the process, citizens who were unfamiliar with the process and legal guidelines were more likely to pay bribes: "When we don't have information about the process of the work, we will pay bribe."³⁸ The most likely mechanism for

³³ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 3.

³⁴ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 3.

³⁵ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Female 4.

³⁶ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Kabul, Female 1.

³⁷ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 6.

³⁸ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 3.

this is that citizens are unaware of the correct amount they are supposed to pay and/or believe the bribe is part of the normal process; another possibility is that citizens simply see the bribe as an alternative to informing themselves about the process, which is likely not easy to do. A third option is that because citizens are not aware of the process, they have unreasonable expectations as to how long the process will take, and are willing to pay a bribe to bring the reality of the timeline in line with their (incorrect) expectations. Among the Barrier Analysis respondents, some doers (men, and those in Herat), also mentioned that if they hadn't had information about the service procedure and therefore didn't know how much they should pay, they would have paid a bribe.

- **“No other option:”** Several respondents also mentioned that they had to pay a bribe when there is “no other option,”³⁹ though didn't elaborate further.
- **Lack of self-efficacy:** Reflecting doers' drivers of this behaviour, all four disaggregations (male, female, Herat, Kabul) of non-doers were more likely than doers to say that they did not have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe; these results were strongest for men (Table 5).



“When we don't have information about the process of the work, we will pay bribe.”

MALE CITIZEN 3, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, KABUL

	KABUL	HERAT	FEMALE	MALE
Non-Doers	6.7 times more likely not to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	9.4 times more likely not to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	4.4 times more likely not to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe	11.1 times more likely not to have the self-efficacy to refuse to pay a bribe

Table 5. Self-Efficacy for Refusing to Pay a Bribe (Non-Doers, in Comparison to Doers)

³⁹ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Passport, Herat, Female 4.

Analysis

Throughout these responses—regarding both drivers and barriers for refusing to pay a bribe—citizens implicitly acknowledged that in some situations they have control over the circumstances that may result in bribery. This includes if they have enough time to complete the service process, and if they have enough information about the process.

Similarly, many citizens responded to these questions in such a way that implied they were comfortable paying bribes when it benefitted them. On the other hand, a few citizens interpreted these question more broadly, and noted that they will not pay a bribe only “when corrupt individuals get fired from the offices and tasks are given to honest employees.”⁴⁰ This response alludes to some citizens’ perception of corruption as a widespread and endemic problem, and one that they themselves do not have the capacity to avoid through personal actions. However, this was a minority opinion.

There were several factors examined by the Barrier Analysis that did not show significant differences between doers and non-doers—indicating that these factors were neither drivers nor barriers. For some of these, the fact that they are not drivers or barriers (at least as per the Barrier Analysis methodology, the results of which should be considered with some caution, as noted elsewhere) is worth noting. Factors that were not significant barriers or drivers included:

- The belief that citizens have a responsibility to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Both doers and non-doers generally agreed with this.
- The belief that one could personally fight corruption. Both doers and non-doers agreed that they could not personally fight corruption.

It is curious that respondents did not believe that they could personally fight corruption, despite

insisting that citizens do have a responsibility to fight corruption; this may simply be another contradiction that citizens find a way of justifying, instead of confronting and reconciling.

⁴⁰ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Male 4.

REPORTING CORRUPTION

Drivers of Reporting Corruption

Examining the second behaviour for citizens, respondent identified several factors that made them more likely to report corruption:

- **High bribe amount:** Citizens noted that they were more likely to report extreme or unfeasible bribe requests, as this was deemed a more unacceptable violation: “If a lot of money is asked as a bribe and I’m not able to pay that then I might report it.”⁴¹ In the context of this question, several respondents also linked the unreasonableness of the bribe specifically to their inability to pay, as though they were dismayed that the public servant would dare ask them to pay a bribe that they couldn’t afford.
- **When paying a bribe did not lead to the desired results (work completed or speedily processing):** Citizens viewed failure to provide services after paying a bribe as another example of an unacceptable violation of the system, which they deemed worth reporting: “When I pay a bribe and if the bribe receiver does not do the work accordingly, in this case I would report it.”⁴² This alludes to the fact that bribery is largely accepted, and that there is an implicitly-understood set of norms guiding these behaviours. In this case, it is not the fact that the public servant has asked for a bribe that the citizen finds unacceptable, but rather that the public servant has not held up their end of the bargain after receiving the bribe.
- **When a corruption-free agency for reporting exists and the report will be taken seriously:** Perhaps the most commonly-mentioned driver of reporting corruption was having a known and trusted agency to which they could report corruption: “I will report to an entity where I know they would respond to my complaint and they are not corrupt themselves;”⁴³ “When I feel that there is an entity which tracks the corruption case seriously.”⁴⁴ Similarly, male non-doers and those in Herat said that they would have reported corruption if they had expected the report to be taken seriously and that the corruption would have been addressed. However, this factor was not mentioned by doers as a driver of their behaviour—only by non-doers—pointing to another misalignment between the perceptions of doers and non-doers.
- **Having documented evidence of corruption:** Given the added risks associated with reporting corruption, many citizens cited the need for concrete documentation of their corruption claims in order to file a complaint: “I will report to higher authorities only IF I have proof in hand.”⁴⁵
- **Having the time and patience to follow up on their report:** Citizens noted that it was often necessary to repeatedly request information regarding the progress or status of an investigation into their claims. This means that those who had the time and means to follow up on their claim were more likely to report in the first place: “When I have enough time for tracking corruption report cases.”⁴⁶

⁴¹ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 3.

⁴² Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 4.

⁴³ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 5.

⁴⁴ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Male 1.

⁴⁵ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Herat, Female 3.

⁴⁶ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Herat, Male 2.

- Being confident that security and confidentiality will be maintained:** Citizens often expressed that they wanted to be sure their safety and anonymity would be sustained during the reporting process, alluding to a fear of reprisal from public servants: “[We would report corruption] if we don’t feel any type of threat from bribe takers;”⁴⁷ “[If] identities are kept secret and there will be no consequences to the person himself, he would have reported for sure.”⁴⁸
- Moral obligations:** Among Barrier Analysis respondents, doers in Herat were more likely than non-doers to mention wanting to hold the corrupt official accountable as a factor that convinced them to report corruption; the responses for female doers also pointed towards this factor as a main driver, though the results were not significant. In the same category of drivers linked to morality, Barrier Analysis doers (men and those in Herat) reported that a main advantage of reporting corruption was feeling proud to fight corruption, while non-doers in Herat reported that feeling like a good Muslim would have been an advantage of reporting corruption (male non-doers also mentioned this, but the results were not significant).
- Self-Efficacy:** A strong pattern emerges that doers have substantially more self-efficacy to report corruption than non-doers (Table 6). While the results for female respondents and those in Kabul were not significant due to small samples, the general pattern of this data is still in line with this conclusion. In addition, unlike for behaviour 1, the pattern of self-efficacy among doers was reflected in respondents’ answers to other questions regarding what citizens can do to fight corruption. Among doers, men and those in Herat strongly agreed with the statement “There are actions I can take to support the fight against corruption in Afghanistan;” non-doers in Herat neither

agreed nor disagreed.

	KABUL	HERAT
Doers	(no significant data)	24.9 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to report corruption
	FEMALE	MALE
	(no significant data)	48.2 times more likely to have the self-efficacy to report corruption

Table 6. Self-Efficacy for Reporting Corruption (Doers, in Comparison to Non-Doers)

Some citizens also mentioned other factors that, while not commonly reported, are still worth mentioning, including if the corruption is related to sexual abuse, and if they could afford paying the bribes that would be required in order to file the corruption complaint. The responses of two groups of doers in the Barrier Analysis—male doers and those in Kabul—also indicated that the fact that reporting corruption was the right thing to do was a driver of their behaviour, those these findings are not significant.

⁴⁷ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Passport, Kabul, Male 3.

⁴⁸ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 7.

Barriers to Reporting Corruption

The barriers to reporting corruption reported by citizens closely mirrored the drivers of reporting corruption:

- **Lack of trust in the agency they are reporting to:** The most common reason citizens said they would not report corruption was their lack of faith in any government agency or institution to investigate, let alone prosecute, their claims. Many respondents also alluded to the corruption with the entities meant to be investigating corruption: “It is not logical to make a report about the corruption, because there is not any entity to provide them with report and to consider your report. Any entity you want to report to are engaged in corruption.”⁴⁹
- **Fear of personal or familial retributions:** Another very frequent and related reason for not reporting corruption was fear for personal safety and the safety of their families. For many individuals the risk of reprisals was too high to report bribes: “If I feel that there is some danger by reporting corruption for me or my family, I would not report it.”⁵⁰ Non-doers in Herat also mentioned risks to them and their families as a reason not to report corruption.



“[I would report corruption] if we don’t feel any type of threat from bribe takers.”

MALE CITIZEN 3, OBTAINING A PASSPORT, KABUL

- **Lack of family approval:** Many citizens, especially women and younger respondents, noted that without their family’s approval they would not proceed with reporting corruption: “When my family don’t want me to report the corruption, or my report is not acceptable, I would not report it.”⁵¹

- **Lack of knowledge about the reporting process:** Given the lack of information around reporting mechanisms, citizens mentioned not understanding or knowing where to report their claims as a fundamental barrier to doing so: “I wanted to report the corruption of that lady who asked me for money, but I did not know the process of reporting the corruption, so I did not report.”⁵²
- **High costs in terms of time and money:** When asked about disadvantages of reporting corruption, doers (men and those in Herat) mentioned that it would take a long time to file the report. Non-doers in Herat also noted that a disadvantage of reporting corruption would be the high cost of filing the report.
- **Lack of self-efficacy:** As with behaviour 1, not having self-efficacy was a significant barrier that non-doers faced in reporting corruption. Non-doers also frequently answered “I don’t know” when asked if they had the self-efficacy to report corruption, which can be interpreted as an additional indication of their lack of self-efficacy (Table 7). In addition, male non-doers were also more likely than doers to say that there are not things they could personally do this week to fight corruption in Afghanistan.

Citizens also mentioned that, while not a barrier per se, they would not report corruption if it was minimal, or they found it acceptable: “If the corruption is within a satisfactory limit...I will not report it.”⁵³

⁴⁹ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 2.

⁵⁰ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 2.

⁵¹ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Kabul, Female 1.

⁵² Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Kabul, Female 2.

⁵³ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Herat, Male 6.

Analysis

As with behaviour 1, some of the drivers and barriers for reporting a bribe were within citizens' control and some were outside of citizens' control, i.e. primarily how government entities and public servants reacted to a report being filed. Some factors also fall into both categories: how citizens are affected depends both on external factors but also how citizens interpret and react to external factors.

Regarding whether doers and non-doers would decide to report corruption the next time, male doers said it was "very likely" and "somewhat likely" that they would report corruption again, while male non-doers and those in Herat mentioned that it was "somewhat unlikely" or "neither likely nor unlikely" that they would report corruption in the future. This implies that respondents were relatively satisfied with the outcome of their behaviours.



"If the corruption is within a satisfactory limit...I will not report it."

MALE CITIZEN 6, OBTAINING A LAND DEED, HERAT

	KABUL	HERAT	FEMALE	MALE
Non-Doers	(no significant data)	<p>16.4 times more likely not to have the self-efficacy to report corruption</p> <p>9.5 times more likely to respond "I don't know"</p>	(no significant data)	<p>More likely not to have the self-efficacy to report corruption</p> <p>10.3 times more likely to respond "I don't know"</p>

Table 7. Self-Efficacy for Reporting Corruption (Non-Doers, in Comparison to Doers)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONTEXT OF BEHAVIOURS

While the above sections specifically outlined drivers and barriers of the two selected behaviours, there are a number of other factors and considerations that are relevant to citizens' behaviours, and the choices they make when accessing government services. The factors discussed in this section either do not necessarily fit into the category of driver or barrier, or there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that they represent a driver or barrier, but they are nonetheless relevant.

Religious Beliefs



"Yeah there are some types of bribe which are acceptable to us with paying less money. But totally giving bribe is a bad action and it is forbidden in our religion Islam."

MALE CITIZEN 3, OBTAINING A LAND DEED, KABUL

Citizens who participated in the interviews overwhelmingly agreed that Islam forbids bribery both for the bribe giver and receiver. Among Barrier Analysis participants, however, the results were slightly less clear. Doers for behaviour 1 confirmed that refusing to pay a bribe aligned with their religious beliefs (Figure 10). While the majority of non-doers for behaviour 1 admitted that paying a bribe is not aligned with their religious beliefs, a notable minority did claim that paying a bribe aligned with their religious beliefs (Figure 11). This contradicts other evidence—from this study and others—that showed that even people who pay bribes acknowledge that bribery does not align with their religious beliefs. One possible explanation is that when respondents were confronted with a yes or no question—as opposed to an open-ended question that they could answer through a narrative response—they simply could not admit that their behaviour was contrary to their religion, especially if they knew they would not have the opportunity to justify this.




Figure 10. "Does Refusing to Pay a Bribe Align with Your Religious Beliefs?" (Doers, Behaviour 1)




Figure 11. "Does Paying a Bribe Align with Your Religious Beliefs?" (Non-Doers, Behaviour 1)

For behaviour 2, doers and non-doers both said that reporting corruption was aligned with their religious beliefs,⁵⁴ which confirms the cognitive dissonance noted elsewhere, i.e. non-doers recognize that their actions are not aligned with their religion, yet find a way to justify this nevertheless.

Cultural Rules and Taboos

For behaviour 1, a sizable portion of both doers and non-doers reported that there were community laws or rules that encouraged them to undertake their respective behaviour (refusing to pay a bribe; paying a bribe); in some cases, this was a majority. In particular, women frequently said these laws and rules existed; the main exception was male non-doers, most of whom said "I don't know." However, "I don't know" was a relatively frequent response, and substantial minorities among both doers and non-doers also said that community laws or rules encouraging their respective behaviours did not exist. The responses for doers are shown in Figure 12 and the responses for non-doers are shown in Figure 13.




Figure 12. "Are There Any Community Laws or Rules in Place that Encouraged You to Refuse to Pay a Bribe?" (Doers, Behaviour 1)




Figure 13. "Are There Any Community Laws or Rules in Place That Encouraged You to Decide to Pay a Bribe?" (Non-Doers, Behaviour 1)

⁵⁴ Unlike for behaviour 1, this question asked about the same behaviour (reporting corruption) for both doers and non-doers.

For behaviour 2, both doers and non-doers also reported that there are community laws or rules in place that encouraged them or would have encouraged them to report corruption. Female doers and male doers gave this response less often than other respondents, though the sample size for the former was small. There was less ambiguity in the responses to this question regarding reporting corruption than to the corresponding question regarding bribery, suggesting that reporting corruption is more clearly in line with community rules than either refusing to pay a bribe, or paying a bribe.

In addition to community laws and rules, Barrier Analysis respondents were also asked about relevant cultural rules of taboos. For behaviour 1, both doers and non-doers' answers aligned with the narrative that cultural rules and taboos support refusing to pay a bribe, with doers reporting that cultural rules encouraged them to refuse bribery (Figure 14) and non-doers reporting that there were no cultural rules that encouraged them to pay a bribe (Figure 15). It is interesting that non-doers gave a somewhat opposite response to the previous question regarding community laws and rules, which was rather similar. It is possible the answer is related to how these questions were translated into Dari, and the difference in meaning between "community laws or rules" on the one hand, and "cultural rules or taboos" on the other.




Figure 14. "Are There Any Cultural Rules or Taboos That Encouraged You to Refuse to Pay a Bribe?" (Doers)




Figure 15. "Are There Any Cultural Rules or Taboos That Encouraged You to Pay a Bribe?" (Non-Doers)

For behaviour 2, both doers and non-doers agreed that there were no cultural rules or taboos that discouraged reporting corruption;⁵⁵ the one exception was non-doers in Herat, most of whom replied "I don't know." The responses for doers are shown in Figure 16 and the responses for non-doers are shown in Figure 17. It is encouraging that reporting corruption is accepted in communities, and that there are no stigmas against reporting corruption. However, as noted previously, other barriers to reporting corruption still exist.

⁵⁵ NB: For behaviour 2, this question was worded such that both doers and non-doers were asked about cultural rules or taboos that discouraged corruption; for behaviour 1, this question asked doer and non-doers about opposite behaviours (refusing to pay a bribe, and paying a bribe).




Figure 16. "Are There Any Cultural Rules or Taboos That Discouraged You from Reporting Corruption?" (Doers, Behaviour 2)




Figure 17. "Are There Any Cultural Rules or Taboos That Would Have Discouraged You from Reporting Corruption?" (Non-Doers, Behaviour 2)

Social Norms

Social norms—including empirical expectations (what one thinks others will do) and normative expectations (what one thinks others will expect one to do)—are highly important to consider in the context of any behaviour that will be observed by friends, family, and the wider community. Magenta found in the Citizen Journey Mapping Report⁵⁶ that there are few if any social sanctions for engaging in corruption in Afghanistan, indicating that social norms broadly condone petty corruption, and sometimes may even encourage it. This section elaborates further on these social norms.

Encouraging Others to Refuse to Pay a Bribe

As part of the interviews, citizens were asked what they would say to others to encourage them not to pay a bribe. Responses fell into several categories, mainly:

- Religious arguments:** Many respondents said they would cite religious reasons for not paying a bribe: "Don't pay a bribe, because the bribe is forbidden in Islam and you will collect sins for yourself."⁵⁷
- Contributing to the fight against corruption:** Citizens pointed to the role that individuals could play in fighting corruption: "When you pay, it means you support corruption and you will increase corruption, it is better you should not pay a bribe and play a positive role in the eradication of corruption."⁵⁸ Respondents were far more willing to acknowledge the role that citizens can play in contributing to anti-corruption efforts when talking about others, rather than themselves, as seen above. Along the same lines, many respondents cited the overall negative effects of corruption in society and said they would urge others not to contribute to these issues: "Giving bribes will affect our country's economy and it will

⁵⁶ Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, February 2019.

⁵⁷ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 3.

⁵⁸ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Male, Herat 6.

create a crisis. Giving and receiving bribes makes our country corrupt and we should try not to pay bribes, and fight against corruption."⁵⁹



"Giving bribes will affect our country's economy and it will create a crisis. Giving and receiving bribes makes our country corrupt and we should try not to pay bribes, and fight against corruption."

FEMALE CITIZEN 4, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, KABUL

- **Stigma and shame:** Some citizens referenced the shame that bribery may cause as a potential deterrent: "I will tell them to remain patient and process their work through legal ways so that bribe takers get ashamed of their behaviour. I myself with my family members try our best to not succumb to the pressure of the process and go through legal ways so that we do not become shameful in the society."⁶⁰

There is a clear discrepancy between what citizens cited as the drivers and barriers to paying a bribe on the one hand, and how they said they would try to dissuade others from paying a bribe on the other hand. For example, despite noting that having information about the process would enable them to refuse to pay a bribe, citizens did not mention this as a way to deter others from paying a bribe. While it is possible this is due in part to how the questions were phrased, it may also indicate a lack of self-awareness on the part of citizens.

Encouraging Others to Report Corruption⁶¹

Citizens were also asked what they might say to others to encourage them to report corruption. The vast majority of responses cited the importance of contributing to anti-corruption efforts: "I will encourage my friends to report the

corruption cases, because it will help to bring the corrupt people to court and it will be a good lesson for others who are engaged in corruption. If we want all citizens to have equal access to services, we should report the corruption cases."⁶² As in this response, many also noted that reporting corruption would serve to punish the guilty public servants, and dissuade others from engaging in corruption. A few respondents noted that they would only encourage others to report corruption if it wouldn't be detrimental to their families: "If they know that reporting corruption won't damage them and their family, they should go report corruption."⁶³ Interestingly, compared to the corresponding question asked vis-à-vis refusing to pay a bribe, in response to this question citizens rarely invoked religion. This is perhaps because citizens felt that paying a bribe was more sinful than not reporting corruption—in one case the difference is between actively committing a sin or not, whereas in the other the difference is between actively supporting anti-corruption efforts or simply remaining neutral.



"If they know that reporting corruption won't damage them and their family, they should go report corruption."

FEMALE CITIZEN 4, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, KABUL

Social Norms Around Bribe Paying

Among behaviour 1, doers across all four disaggregations reported that they thought most people supported the decision to refuse to pay a bribe. On the other hand, female non-doers and those in Herat said that most people do not agree with refusing to pay a bribe, i.e. most people would support paying a bribe (Table 8).

⁵⁹ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Female 4.

⁶⁰ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Female 3.

⁶¹ In the questionnaire, this was phrased specifically in terms of reporting a bribe.

⁶² Citizen interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Male 3.

⁶³ Citizen interview, Obtaining a Passport, Herat, Female 3.

It should be noted, however, that the direction of causality is not clear. While it is possible that social norms influence behaviours (i.e. contribute to the decision of whether or not to pay a bribe), it is also possible that behaviours influence how people interpret social norms. The principle of confirmation bias (that people seek out information and evidence that confirms their pre-existing beliefs) is well documented in the literature and could be a factor here. That is, people who pay bribes may seek to justify their actions by adopting the belief that others around them also approve of paying bribes, thereby generating social validation for their actions. Further research would be needed to confirm the direction of causality.

	KABUL	HERAT	FEMALE	MALE
Doers	1.9 times more likely to say that most people agree with refusing to pay a bribe	3.9 times more likely to say that most people agree with refusing to pay a bribe	3.2 times more likely to say that most people agree with refusing to pay a bribe	2.0 times more likely to say that most people agree with refusing to pay a bribe
Non-Doers	(no significant data)	2.6 times more likely to say that most people do not agree with refusing to pay a bribe	2.6 times more likely to say that most people do not agree with refusing to pay a bribe	(no significant data)

Table 8. Normative Expectations of Bribery (Behaviour 1). Doers are compared to non-doers and vice versa.

Both doers and non-doers for behaviour 1 were then asked who supports/would support their decision to refuse paying a bribe.⁶⁴ For the below data, as multiple responses could be selected, the total number of responses exceeds the number of respondents, and respondents did not necessarily give the same number of answers to the question of who agrees and who disagrees (note that the scale on the y axis is different between). As such, in the Figures below it is more useful to focus on the relative prevalence of answers, and not the absolute number of answers.

Both doers and non-doers reported that family members and friends would agree with refusing to pay a bribe, and to a lesser extent their spouse and community members (Figure 18). A small portion of non-doers mentioned that nobody would agree with refusing to pay a bribe.

⁶⁴ Due to multiple responses, this question was not analysed using the Barrier Analysis methodology.



Figure 18. "Who Agrees with Refusing to Pay a Bribe?" (Behaviour 1)

As for who would disagree with refusing to pay a bribe (i.e., who would support paying a bribe), both doers and non-doers said that friends would disagree, more so than the extent to which family would disagree (Figure 19). Non-doers also thought that their spouse would disagree more than doers thought this. Notably, a sizable portion of non-doers mentioned that nobody would disagree with refusing to pay a bribe (i.e. non-doers thought that others were likely to agree with paying a bribe). These findings suggest that non-doers perceive others to be less critical of bribe paying than doers; in other words, **the normative expectations of both doers and non-doers confirm their behaviour** (and vice versa).




Figure 19. "Who Disagrees with Refusing to Pay a Bribe?" (Behaviour 1)

Social Norms Around Reporting Corruption

Regarding whether respondents thought that most people agreed with reporting corruption, doers (men and those in Herat) confirmed that other people would; there were no reliably significant findings for non-doers. Despite the limited evidence, these findings do again point towards the importance of social norms in influencing behaviour, though the direction of correlation still cannot be confirmed.

Respondents were also asked who would agree and disagree with reporting corruption.⁶⁵ For the below data, as multiple responses could be selected the total number of responses exceed the number of respondents, and respondents did not necessarily give the same number of answers to the question of who agrees and who disagrees (note that the scales on the y axis are different for. As such, in the figures below it is more useful to focus on the relative prevalence of answers, and not the absolute number of answers.

In general, doers reported that family, friends and community members would agree with their decision to report corruption. Non-doers largely reported the same, but many also mentioned that nobody would agree with their decision to report corruption, whereas very few doers selected this option (Figure 20).

Respondents were also asked who did not agree with the decision to report corruption. As above, family and friends were commonly mentioned among both doers and non-doers, though in this case both groups also mentioned that their spouse would disagree with reporting corruption. Slightly more doers said that nobody disagrees with the decision to report corruption, compared to how many doers gave that response to the question of who agrees with the decision (Figure 21).




Figure 20. "Who Agrees With the Decision to Report Corruption?" (Behaviour 2)

⁶⁵ Due to multiple responses, this question was not analysed using the Barrier Analysis methodology.




Figure 21. "Who Disagrees With the Decision to Report Corruption?" (Behaviour 2)

These results point to differing perceptions of social norms on the part of doers and non-doers, with non-doers under the impression that reporting corruption is less socially acceptable than doers seem to believe. Again, it is possible either that normative expectations are influencing behaviour, or that behaviours are influencing normative expectations.

Citizens' Perceptions of Public Servants' Behaviour

Barrier Analysis respondents were asked why they thought public servants solicited bribes.⁶⁶ Both doers and non-doers for behaviour 1 thought that public servants' low salaries was a primary reason why they asked for bribes (Figure 22 and Figure 23). The next most common answer, for both doers and non-doers, was generally "they know the person will pay a bribe," followed closely by "they know they can get away with it." There were no notable patterns between the answers of doers and non-doers for this question. The responses for doers and non-doers of behaviour 2 were largely similar. The first explanation of low salaries was also repeated by public servants themselves as a main driver for why they ask for bribes (see the below section on public servants' behaviours)."

⁶⁶ Due to multiple responses, this question was not analysed using the Barrier Analysis methodology.




Figure 22. "Why Do You Think Public Servants Ask for Bribes?" (Doers, Behaviour 1)




Figure 23. "Why Do You Think Public Servants Ask for Bribes?" (Non-Doers, Behaviour 1)

Agencies for Reporting Corruption

When asked what agencies they would report corruption to, most citizens did provide an answer, though a few said that there was not an agency that dealt with such issues in Afghanistan, or that they didn't trust the entity to address the complaint. Specific entities commonly mentioned by respondents included: the police, the 119 hotline, the Anti-corruption Directorate, and the National Directorate of Security (NDS). One respondent mentioned they would report the corruption to IWA. Some respondents also gave somewhat vague answers, such as "[I would] report directly to the related director of the specific ministry, so the related director/office will start investigation from its own corrupted staff and will ask them to process my work faster."⁶⁷



⁶⁷ Citizen interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 4.

Anticorruption project implementation plan

KEY FINDINGS: PUBLIC SERVANTS AND PETTY CORRUPTION

INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC SERVANTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

Magenta conducted a total of 24 interviews with public servants, the majority of whom were no longer working in government service provision. As this was the only opportunity during the research process to speak with public servants, the questions included both general queries about respondents' experience in their jobs and thoughts on corruption, along with questions on the drivers of soliciting a bribe, in line with the approach used in the rest of this research. In order to increase the likelihood that respondents would answer these somewhat sensitive questions truthfully, all questions were phrased such that they asked about public servants' behaviour in general, and not the behaviour of the specific respondent. The following sections highlight the main findings from these interviews.

General Views on Corruption

Public servants overwhelmingly stated that corruption was a crime, damaging to the country, not aligned with Islam, and contrary to Afghan culture. Respondents also stated that corruption included a variety of illegal acts, including bribery (with money or gifts), nepotism, and abuse of power. Throughout the interviews, public servants clearly expressed that they thought both government staff and citizens were responsible for corruption in Afghanistan: "Corruption is at a high level because from one side government employees are contaminated in corruption, and on the other side citizens who pay bribes to use it to their benefit."⁶⁸ This respondent and a few others did acknowledge that some people benefit from corruption, making it a difficult problem to tackle when "It

seems good for those people who get it but ruins the future for the entire nation."⁶⁹ On the other hand, some respondents also expressed a more blasé attitude, noting that "bribing is a very normal thing now."⁷⁰ One public servant claimed that corruption has been reduced in the justice sector because salaries and "controls" have increased; though according to a number of reports from NGOs in Afghanistan, the justice sector has repeatedly been identified as one of the most corrupt sectors in the country.⁷¹



"Corruption is at a high level because from one side government employees are contaminated in corruption, and on the other side citizens who pay bribes to use it to their benefit."

MALE PUBLIC SERVANT 2, OBTAINING A DRIVERS LICENSE, HERAT

Corruption as Covered in the Media

A number of respondents mentioned that they had heard reports about corruption in the media. Many noted that they had heard about the initial corruption case, but not the final outcome. This left many public servants somewhat disappointed and distrustful of the government's capacity to address corruption. A few also mentioned that the guilty party in the media report had avoided punishment by paying an additional bribe, which was seen as a negative outcome by public servants.

Admired People and Institutions

When public servants were asked about any people or institutions that they admired, a common answer was that they didn't admire

⁶⁸ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Male 1.

⁶⁹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 1.

⁷⁰ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Herat, Male 1.

⁷¹ IWA, National Corruption Survey 2018, 2018.

anyone or any entity: “None of them, because they are all contaminated in corruption. They misuse their positions and jobs. No one is loyal to the country.”⁷² A few respondents did cite specific entities that they admire, which are mentioned below (none of the respondents mentioned an individual person):

- **The Afghan Army:** “People always appreciate and admire military activities across the country. They are always ready to serve and they don’t act against law and order. They always defend the country. They accept their salaries. Well, there might be some small issues but in general they are heroes and work better.”⁷³ (Mentioned by one respondent)

- **The Ministry of Education:** “They provide education services at private and governmental sectors level to the community. It helps to improve the education level and reduce the level of illiteracy in the country which make our citizens accountable and responsible to their society.”⁷⁴ (Mentioned by two respondents)

- **The Supreme Court:** “Works and services became clear and the system somehow updated. The monitoring and observation system become active to limit corruption.”⁷⁵ (Mentioned by two respondents)

- **The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs:** “When citizens plan to go for Hajj, they provide more facilities for them with reasonable fee.”⁷⁶ (Mentioned by one respondent)

- **The Passport Department:** “The work of citizens decreased from weeks to days.”⁷⁷ (Mentioned by three respondents, two of whom had worked in the Passport service process)

- **Municipality Workers:** “They are busy all day cleaning the city. They work in hot and cool weather with low salaries. They serve in a city with 5 million people and the capacity of the municipality doesn’t meet the requirements of the city. They always try to do their work in good quality.”⁷⁸ (Mentioned by one respondent)

⁷² Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 1.

⁷³ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 2.

⁷⁴ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Kabul, Male 1.

⁷⁵ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 2.

⁷⁶ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 2.

⁷⁷ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 2.

⁷⁸ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Kabul, Male 2.

Views on Anti-Corruption Efforts

Public servants had a spectrum of views on anti-corruption efforts, from feeling that nothing can be done about corruption to believing that citizens and the government do have a role to play:

- **No one has the power to fight corruption:** “No one has enough power to fight with lawbreakers. Even the President doesn't have power to prevent it because corruption is melted in all offices of government.”⁷⁹
- **Only the highest powers in the country are able to address corruption:** Respondents mentioned the National Directorate of Security, the President, anti-corruption institutions in general, and the security services were responsible for fighting corruption. Some also mentioned that corruption would need to be addressed at the top levels of the country before it could be addressed on a more local level. One public servant thought that only the UN would be able to address corruption, as even the government was not powerful enough to do so.
- **Both the government and citizens have a responsibility to address corruption:** “In my view, everyone must start from her/his self. If he or she, government employee or citizen, they try to stand against corruption. Because when someone start from their own self, others will also do the same. When they see any corruption, they should cooperate with each other to finish and solve the problem.”⁸⁰

Specific anti-corruption interventions that respondents suggested included: increasing public servants' salaries, digitizing the government systems, creating better monitoring systems, hiring more qualified and honest staff, and putting hidden cameras inside offices. Public servants were also overwhelmingly in favour of punishing bribe seekers, and many pointed

out that punishing a few people in a high-profile way would successfully deter others from engaging in corruption. Some also mentioned that punishment would be effective only if the guilty party could not bribe their way out of the situation, which is apparently quite common. One respondent also mentioned that citizens should be punished as well for their role in corruption.

⁷⁹ Public servant interview. Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Male 2.

⁸⁰ Public servant interview. Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 2.

DRIVERS OF SOLICITING A BRIBE

During the interviews, public servants were asked about drivers for soliciting a bribe, including factors that made public servants more likely to ask for bribes, the circumstances in which they would be more likely to solicit bribes, and the type of public servants that would be more likely to solicit a bribe.⁸¹ This question was intended to identify factors specific to public servants and their work environment. While respondents did mention those factors affecting their own behaviour and circumstances, they also frequently framed their responses in terms of citizens' behaviour and circumstances, implying that public servants sometimes had to solicit a bribe because of the situation citizens put them in, or asked for a bribe simply because the opportunity to do so had presented itself and they had no choice but to take advantage of it. In this way, **public servants maintained a narrative of their own innocence, at least in part, by minimizing their own role in what they do acknowledge to be a harmful and nefarious practice.** Magenta's Citizen Journey Mapping Report found that citizens exhibited a very similar pattern of responses.⁸² The next sub-sections summarize the factors cited by public servants to explain why they solicit bribes, divided into factors affecting citizens' behaviour, and factors affecting public servants' behaviour.

Drivers Controlled by Citizens

When discussing factors that affected citizens' behaviours vis-à-vis bribery, public servants rarely specified who initiated the corruption. Instead, respondents often phrased their answers in terms of how citizens contributed to the set of circumstances in which a bribe was paid. Respondents described several such situations:

1. **Citizens request that work be done illegally, or very quickly:** "When citizens asked for illegal work or they want to have the service, in short time, service providers asked them bribe."⁸³ Examples of illegal work included not having all of the required documentation, or skipping steps in the process. In this case, it seems that the public servant felt justified requesting or accepting a bribe, because the citizen has asked for something outside the normal scope of the public servant's duties. In one case, a respondent absolved public servants of all responsibility: "In fact, when citizens themselves provide an opportunity and ask for illegal work from service providers, then it is not the fault of service providers; or when citizens are in a hurry to complete the services, or when there is a rush of citizens. In these cases, service providers can easily ask for a bribe from them."⁸⁴
2. **Citizens are unaware of the correct process:** "Most of the time citizens by themselves pave the way for bribery because they are not aware of work process, rules and regulations."⁸⁵ This was mentioned very frequently in response to this question, and also the opposite was mentioned as a reason for why public servants do not solicit bribes (i.e. because the citizen is aware of the process).

⁸¹ All questions in the survey were phrased generally, i.e. did not ask about the specific experiences of the interviewee, but rather public servants in general.

⁸² Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, February 2019.

⁸³ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Herat, Male 1.

⁸⁴ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Passport, Kabul, Male 1.

⁸⁵ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Male 2.

3. **Citizens do not report corruption:** This was somewhat of a minority opinion, but worth mentioning as it is a surprisingly blunt example of a “victim blaming” mentality: “In this case, citizens also make the bribery easy when they pay it without any main reason. Because citizens don’t complain to top management, which results in more corruption.”⁸⁶ This answer was given in response to a question about the kinds of service providers who solicit bribes, but clearly shows that the respondent has twisted the narrative in his head to instead blame citizens.

These factors also reflect the kinds of citizens that public servants think are most likely to pay bribes, i.e. those who want their work done quickly, and those who are not aware of the correct process. A few respondents also mentioned that illiterate and/or poor citizens would be more likely to pay a bribe, likely due to their lack of knowledge and vulnerability to public servants’ demands. One public servant thought that “some might just like to break the law and they might get a sense of fulfilment doing so such as paying bribe.”⁸⁷ While the respondent was referring to citizens, the same could easily be applied to public servants.



“It is also possible that citizens’ work have no issues but they don’t know how to process the case. In these cases, service providers ask bribe to lead and solve their work.”

MALE PUBLIC SERVANT 1, OBTAINING A LAND DEED, HERAT

Drivers Controlled by Public Servants

Respondents mentioned the following factors as drivers of public servants’ behaviour of soliciting bribes:

Low salary: This was mentioned throughout the interviews as a main factor that led service providers to ask for bribes. Salaries received by public servants are certainly low. However, not everyone agreed that this was a justified reason. One participant argued that “it cannot be a good logic, they should adjust their life with that amount of salary.”⁸⁸ Another participant mentioned that some public servants bought their position in the first place, and now needed to ask for bribes to recoup the costs. While this may appear to present an easy fix to corruption—simply raise the salaries of public servants and they will no longer solicit bribes—the reality may be more complicated. Now that public servants are in the habit of soliciting (and accepting) bribes, and know that they can get away with it with few risks, this behaviour would likely continue even if the immediate need for the extra money was no longer present.

Lack of monitoring/oversight in the office: Many public servants admitted that if they are being closely watched by their managers, or if there are other monitoring mechanisms in place, they would be less likely to ask for a bribe—at least in the office. Numerous respondents further explained that bribery still takes place, just outside the office, and often through a middleman.

Peers are soliciting bribes: This response was not given directly in response to this question, but was mentioned elsewhere in the interviews; i.e. if one public servant pays a bribe, others around him are more likely to do so as well. Respondents mentioned that this could also work in reverse: if one person is punished for soliciting bribes, this

⁸⁶ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 1.

⁸⁷ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Passport, Kabul, Male 1.

⁸⁸ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 1.

would deter others from doing the same.

Public servants in positions of power: Many agreed that managers and others with significant influence—and likely impunity due to their power—would be more likely to ask for bribes. However, one respondent disagreed and said the opposite.

In terms of mechanisms for soliciting a bribe, respondents often mentioned that public servants would create difficulties for citizens, until they had no choice but to pay a bribe: “They will take bribe at any time convenient for them. For instance, if a police or traffic officer stops by a car who has breached the law, after some minutes he will take money and let them go. Or if the government worker is searching for obstacles he says your work can be processed it will charge you expenses and they will take bribe someplace that no one is present.”⁸⁹ Other times, it seems public servants may take advantage of natural or random obstacles in the service delivery process to use that as an opportunity to solicit a bribe: “When they see that there is an obstacle in processing the citizen’s works, then they don’t process their work until they pay them bribe.”⁹⁰



“When they see that there is an obstacle in processing the citizen’s works, then they don’t process their work until they pay them bribe.”

MALE PUBLIC SERVANT 1, FILING A COMPLAINT, KABUL

Respondents typically said that the advantages of soliciting a bribe would be the extra money gained from that bribe, though a few said that bribery has no advantages. One public servant answered this question by comparing bribery to cigarettes: “I think bribery is similar in nature to cigarettes, because it doesn’t have social advantages and has a lot of disadvantages, but more people use it for their fancy lifestyle. Bribery can be advantageous for a person, but brings a dangerous future and illegal wealth.”⁹¹



⁸⁹ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 2.

⁹⁰ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Passport, Kabul, Male 1.

⁹¹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 1.

BARRIERS TO SOLICITING A BRIBE

The responses to the question of what would deter public servants from soliciting a bribe largely mirrored the drivers cited above, i.e. respondents mentioned that higher salaries for public servants would help reduce petty corruption. For the sake of brevity, the full list of barriers will not be repeated here. However, it is worth noting some of these answers, simply because they reflect the same pattern of public servants focusing on external factors that seemingly provide an irresistible opportunity to solicit a bribe, rather than their own behaviour. For example, one respondent noted that public servants won't request a bribe "when citizens' documents and work are according to law and there are no mistakes on their documents. Service providers can't find any issue on this work and there is no excuse to ask for bribe."⁹² Other factors included heavy oversight in the office (though it was mentioned in response to other questions that in such cases the bribe would just be exchanged outside of the office) and if the citizen in question has authority or influence.

level. However, a number of public servants also mentioned that people who requested bribes would be stigmatized within their community. For example, respondents mentioned that bribe seekers would "become less respected among society and families,"⁹³ would be "shameful to his/her conscience,"⁹⁴ "the bribe taker will become humiliated,"⁹⁵ "it becomes [their] dishonour,"⁹⁶ they "will not be respected by anyone in the community,"⁹⁷ and "their respect, dignity and honour would decrease."⁹⁸ Assuming these consequences are accurate, they should deter public servants from soliciting bribes. However, corruption is still very common in Afghanistan, indicating that public servants are, at a very minimum, accepting bribes, if not outright soliciting them. A possible explanation is that public servants have created a narrative for themselves in which the corruption is driven by citizens, so they themselves are not actually guilty of this transgression, and are able to avoid the public stigma they happen to be so aware of.



"If they know that reporting corruption won't damage them and their family, they should go report corruption."

FEMALE CITIZEN 4, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, KABUL

In terms of the disadvantages of soliciting a bribe, many respondents pointed to the large-scale consequences of corruption on a national

⁹² Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 1.

⁹³ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 1.

⁹⁴ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Male 2.

⁹⁵ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Herat, Male 1.

⁹⁶ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Male 1.

⁹⁷ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Passport, Herat, Male 1.

⁹⁸ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Kabul, Male 1.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE CONTEXT OF SOLICITING A BRIBE

As with the two citizen behaviours, there are several other relevant factors that affect the overall context in which public servants decide whether or not to solicit a bribe, but that do not clearly fall in the category of drivers or barriers. The following sections address some of these factors.

Perceived Feelings On Bribery

Respondents were asked how they thought public servants feel when they solicit a bribe. Some answered simply that public servants would be happy, because they are earning extra money. Others alluded to social stigma in their answers, using phrases such as “they feel humiliation and shame in front of their conscience and ego,”⁹⁹ “he would feel embarrassed and ashamed,”¹⁰⁰ and “they are feeling small and humble.”¹⁰¹

Public servants were also asked about how they thought citizens feel when they are asked to pay bribes. Most respondents recognized that citizens would not be pleased: “They feel disappointed since the work should be done for them as their right, but today they can [only] get it by paying a bribe. This alienates them from the

government.”¹⁰² On the other hand, quite a few respondents also recognized that how citizens feel depends on the degree to which they are complicit in the bribery. If citizens are prepared to pay a bribe and see this as benefiting them, obviously they will be pleased: “No doubt that some of them will feel very sad because they are made to pay that amount by force and they lack money, however; others will get happy because the document is processed quickly.”¹⁰³

Social Norms

In order to identify normative expectations around soliciting bribes, respondents were asked about what public servants thought of other public servants who both did and did not solicit bribes. The answers reflected a single narrative, but were expressed in two ways:

Public servants have a negative perception of their peers who do ask for bribes: “They condemn them and count bribe against law and Islamic rules.”¹⁰⁴ Several respondents also mentioned that such people would ultimately face the consequences of their actions on “judgement day.” One public servant explained that those who do not solicit bribes may advise their colleagues against corruption: “Those employees who are not engaged in bribery provide advice to those who are engaged in corruption, not to perform this bad action in order to have a transparent and sound administration.”¹⁰⁵

Public servants have a positive perception of their peers who do not ask for bribes: “They will think good of other service providers who don’t ask for bribes. They will say that they are satisfied with their salaries. They serve to their country and nation. They are living proudly. Citizens also see them having good behaviour. They are happy about their honesty and performance. They have a good name in the office and society.”¹⁰⁶

⁹⁹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 2.

¹⁰⁰ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 2.

¹⁰¹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Kabul, Male 1.

¹⁰² Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 2.

¹⁰³ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Herat, Male 1.

¹⁰⁴ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 1.

¹⁰⁵ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Kabul, Male 1.

¹⁰⁶ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Kabul, Male 2.

In one case, the respondent believed that public servants may have a negative opinion of those who do not ask for bribes, but acknowledged this would be rare: “There are some people who praise and speak highly of [those who don’t solicit bribes], but some other people say he is a loser settling with a small amount of money and he doesn’t have the courage to take a bribe. But to be honest the majority talks of them highly.”¹⁰⁷ If true, this could reflect a culture of peer pressure and bullying among public servants who do solicit bribes, in an attempt to convince their more rule-abiding colleagues to go along with the corruption.

Public servants were also asked about the degree to which corruption was openly discussed in their work environments. Again, answers ranged from admitting that corruption was frequently discussed, to noting that it wasn’t talked about openly, and that colleagues may or may not know who among them solicits bribes. One respondent explained that “It is acceptable. It is clearly seen that corruption exists and no one can deny it because this issue is always discussed and everyone is aware of it.”¹⁰⁸ Another respondent acknowledged that public servants say one thing about corruption but then do another: “It is well known everywhere because everyone knows about it. Most service providers are involved in corruption. But when they discuss it with each other, they count corruption against the law and say it is a bad habit.”¹⁰⁹ Another respondent admitted that “since everyone is involved no one dares to talk, but they accept the bribing is there,”¹¹⁰ again pointing to an implicitly-accepted culture of corruption that public servants know not to discuss openly.

One public servant also provided a useful summary of bribery dynamics in the work environment: “In each office there are different

staff with different ideas. In general, no office wishes to get bribes from citizens. But gradually, they become accustomed with bribery and it becomes an open place for corruption. This is also obvious that in one administration there is not only one person who is corrupt. There are a group of service providers who are involved in this business. They know from each other about the bribe.”¹¹¹

Work Environment

In order to better understand public servants’ overall attitude towards their job, the interviews included questions about what they liked and disliked about their job, including their managers and interactions with citizens.

Likes and Dislikes about the Job

It was expected that public servants would highly dislike their job, which in turn could have been a contributing factor to corruption in government offices. While most public servants generally enjoyed their work,¹¹² they were dissatisfied with their salaries, which many acknowledged were insufficient to provide for them and their families. As discussed above, these low salaries are a clear driver of petty corruption in Afghanistan.



“I like to be a policeman and serve the people and the country.”

MALE PUBLIC SERVANT 1, FILING A COMPLAINT, HERAT

¹⁰⁷ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Herat, Male 2.

¹⁰⁸ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver’s License, Herat, Male 1.

¹⁰⁹ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 1.

¹¹⁰ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint, Herat, Male 2.

¹¹¹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Kabul, Male 2.

¹¹² It is possible that some interviewees were not being entirely honest about how they felt about their work, especially since these questions were asked at the start of the survey.

The vast majority of public servants reported that they liked at least some part of their jobs, with many respondents citing the opportunity to serve their country and help citizens as one of their favourite parts of the work: “I like to be a policeman and serve the people and the country. I have worked in many conditions and have addressed citizens’ problems. I like to work and want citizens to be secure. I happy and like to work in government and to serve my country.”¹¹³ One respondent even mentioned that he “liked to prohibit corruption in my office and staff who worked under my hand.”¹¹⁴



“I like to be a policeman and serve the people and the country.”

MALE PUBLIC SERAVNT 1, FILING A COMPLAINT, HERAT

While public servants were satisfied with the nature of their work and were pleased with their role in the government, respondents were nevertheless troubled by several day-to-day difficulties they encountered, included the following:

- **Corruption is very common in government offices:** “I did not like corruption in the passport department. When I was informed that a service provider got a bribe, I became sad and warned them. Because it put the good work of all other services providers in question. The passport department has a centralized service. It means all over the country, passport services are issued from one point. It creates crowds, rush of citizens, and puts more pressure on service providers. Some citizens had a fake claim, which made us disappointed.”¹¹⁵ Despite respondents’ insistence that they were troubled by corruption, many also provided numerous

justifications for this corruption, and described it as something very normal and unavoidable. This theme of cognitive dissonance and contradiction is repeated throughout much of the research—including in Magenta’s Citizen Journey Mapping Report¹¹⁶—and will be discussed further in the Conclusions section.

- **Offices are crowded and understaffed:** “The crowd of applicants in ACCRA, we had a small number of employees and for this reason people would make noise for delays. Many times I took the applicants out of our department to create some space. The government should really think of increasing the number of employees.”¹¹⁷
- **Public servants are pressured by their managers to engage in corruption:** “When a citizen asks for something illegal, and we don’t want to do it, he will ask the manager to pressure us to do the work.”¹¹⁸

Public servants were also aware that these difficulties had a negative effect on citizens’ rights and justice, which, given their interest in helping and supporting citizens, was disconcerting to respondents: “[I didn’t like] injustice, abuse of power and corruption, because every citizen should be entitled to the same rights, but in some circumstances we have no other choice but to do favouritism for some people.”¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Public servant interview, Filing a Complaint pathway, Herat, Male 1.

¹¹⁴ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate pathway, Kabul, Male 2.

¹¹⁵ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Passport pathway, Kabul, Male 2.

¹¹⁶ Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, 2019.

¹¹⁷ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera pathway, Herat, Male 1.

¹¹⁸ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate pathway, Herat, Male 2.

¹¹⁹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Land Deed, Herat, Male 2.

Influence of Managers

When asked specifically about their relationship with their managers, most public servants gave mixed reviews. Negative feedback about managers was usually related to **demands from managers that public servants engage in corruption to benefit certain powerful or influential people; public servants were uncomfortable with this, but felt they did not have a choice**: “In some cases we had problems with our managers, when they referred to us the illegal work processes of powerful people, gunmen and governmental entities.”¹²⁰

Interactions with Citizens

Respondents' comments about their interactions with citizens reflected a **mentality of “an eye for an eye.”** If citizens treated the public servants well, then the public servants treated them with respect in return: “I have good behaviour with citizens and they have good behaviour with me. Some citizens have rough action and insist on their senseless speech. We should response (sic) accordingly. It is up to citizens if they do their work according to the law and have good deeds with us, then we also have good deeds with them.”¹²¹ Public servants also commonly mentioned citizens' lack of awareness of the process and unreasonable expectations as primary sources of difficulty: “Lack of awareness of citizens of the law, their illegal demands, and lack of information about work processing of documents was something brought delays in their works process.”¹²² In general, public servants phrased these issues in terms of citizens causing difficulties and being unreasonable, which seemed to justify when public servants “would get angry at them”¹²³ in return.



“I have good behaviour with citizens and they have good behaviour with me. Some citizens have rough action and insist on their senseless speech. We should response accordingly. It is up to citizens if they do their work according to the law and have good deeds with us, then we also have good deeds with them.”

MALE PUBLIC SERVANT 2, OBTAINING A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE, HERAT

¹²⁰ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Male 2.

¹²¹ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Marriage Certificate, Herat, Male 2.

¹²² Public servant interview, Obtaining a Driver's License, Kabul, Male 1.

¹²³ Public servant interview, Obtaining a Tazkera, Herat, Male 1.

Anticorruption project implementation plan

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

A number of challenges and limitations were encountered during the research process. In some cases, these factors affected the validity and accuracy of the findings; these instances have also been discussed above in the report where relevant. The main challenges and limitations were as follows:

QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

It was difficult to find doers of the two behaviours examined through the Barrier Analysis: given the pervasive nature of corruption in Afghanistan, it is rare to find citizens who have refused to pay a bribe or reported corruption (the reasons why these behaviours are so rare are explained in the findings). In addition, as corruption and bribery can be sensitive topics in Afghanistan, many potential respondents were hesitant to participate at first, and only agreed to in the end because they had personal connections with the data collection team (snowball sampling was used to identify respondents). It is also possible that some respondents may have not provided entirely accurate information in the surveys. These factors contributed to the small sample sizes for some of the disaggregations; as a result, not all the segmentations could be analysed using the Barrier Analysis methodology, and the significance of some findings was limited.

In general, the Barrier Analysis methodology can produce misleading findings if the data behind the findings is not closely examined. For example, in one instance 87% of doers and 100% of non-doers chose a certain statement and the analysis (as per the pre-set formulas in the analysis template) concluded that “non-doers

are 11 times more likely to give this response.” In this case, a clear majority of both doers and non-doers chose that statement, and there is only a 13 percentage point difference between the two response rates,¹²⁴ calling into question the validity of the findings. The small sample size for some of the analysis exacerbates this concern. In part for this reason, we have triangulated the data from the quantitative survey with the results of the interviews; when reviewing the data Magenta also did a general sense-check of the findings against the Citizen Journey Mapping Report.¹²⁵

During the data collection there were some concerns around the survey duration, with some surveys lasting as short as four minutes, and some lasting over 12 hours; it was originally anticipated that they survey should take 30 – 50 minutes to complete. The data collection team explained that the long surveys were due to technical issues submitting the surveys to the server while in rural areas with poor data/internet access; the explanation given for the short surveys was that the enumerators had become very familiar with the survey tool and in some cases knew the respondents, so could anticipate their answers to some of the demographic questions. It was decided to keep the long surveys but discard and repeat any surveys shorter than ten minutes. During an internal test of how long it took the enumerators to complete the survey themselves, the shortest duration was ten minutes, therefore this was used as the cut-off. A total of ten surveys were discarded and repeated.

The quantitative surveys were planned to be conducted in both urban and rural locations, in order to allow for a disaggregation of the data by urban/rural location. However, the GPS locations included in the final dataset referred to the location where the survey took place, which was different from the location

¹²⁴ Because one of the response rates was 100%, the mandated 15 percentage point difference between doers and non-doers was not applicable, and this result still showed up as statistically significant.

¹²⁵ Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, 2019.

where respondents lived; therefore, these GPS coordinates could not be used to map the urban and rural locations to verify that there was a distinction between these areas. GPS coordinates were not provided for respondents' actual place of residence, and the list of neighbourhoods that was provided corresponding to respondents' place of residence could not easily be cross-checked to determine which neighbourhoods were considered urban and which were considered rural. While the data collection team explained that respondents who lived more than 8km from the city centre were considered rural, and respondents who lived within 8km from the city centre were considered urban, this could not be verified. As a result, disaggregation by urban/rural location was not feasible, given the ambiguity and the lack of confirmation on a clear urban/rural divide.

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

As with the quantitative research, the sensitivity of the topics discussed deterred some potential respondents from participating. In particular, public servants may have been hesitant to discuss their experiences and opinions on corruption due to fear of reprisals, or that the results would not remain anonymous. To mitigate this, where possible, former public servants were interviewed. In addition, the fact that both public servants and citizens were interviewed one-on-one (as opposed to in a focus group discussion) may have encouraged participants to be more honest when they were not speaking in front of peers. This limitation was taken into account when analysing the research findings; many insights were inferred from the data and transcripts based on Magenta's research expertise and in-depth knowledge of the Afghan context.

CONCLUSIONS

EVERYONE LIES, ESPECIALLY TO THEMSELVES

The results from this research largely confirm the main conclusion of Magenta's Citizen Journey Mapping Report:¹²⁶ **Afghans are effectively deceiving themselves when it comes to their own role in corruption, in order to preserve their self-identity as a fundamentally good person.** The Citizen Journey Mapping report presented this finding for citizens, and the initial findings from interviews with public servants included in this study confirm that the insight also applies to public servants. Both parties acknowledge that corruption is nefarious, counter to their religion (with a few limited exceptions), and damaging to the country. Yet both citizens and public servants still acquiesce to corruption, and even initiate corruption when it suits them. Indeed, under certain circumstances both citizens and service providers benefit from corruption, and are willing to use it to their advantage. When asked to explain factors that contribute to corruption, both parties point to some factors within their own control, but also to many factors under the control of the other party. To some degree, this is accurate: there are some situations in which public servants compel citizens to pay a bribe and give them no alternative, for example; but both parties overemphasize the role of their counterparts in creating the set of circumstances that resulted in a bribe being paid, relative to their own role.


This deflected responsibility for corruption is one manifestation of how both citizens and public servants justify to themselves that corruption is acceptable, or that they are not fundamentally bad people for engaging in corruption. It is also possible that recognizing corruption as sinful is morally freeing to those who participate in a system they know to be wrong, as if

acknowledging the immorality of bribery suffices as an excuse for their conscience and then allows them to participate in corruption guilt-free. Rather than actively fighting against the social order they know to be wrong, citizens and public servants describe themselves as at the mercy of external forces outside of their control.

¹²⁶ Citizen Journey Mapping Research Report, Magenta Consulting, February 2019.

SOME DRIVERS AND BARRIERS ARE WITHIN INDIVIDUALS' CONTROL, SOME ARE NOT

When asked about drivers and barriers of the target behaviours, both citizens and public servants listed a variety of factors across the spectrum of factors they could control to factors they could not; for some factors, respondents implied they did not have control, though in reality they could in fact exert some influence on the matter. The main factors (both drivers and barriers) affecting bribery (including both citizens' and public servants' roles) are mapped below in Figure 24.¹²⁷ The main factors (again, both drivers and barriers) affecting whether citizens reported corruption are also mapped below in Figure 25. For both of these graphs, whether the factor is a driver or barrier is not represented for the sake of clarity, and also as in some cases the factor could be both a barrier and driver depending on how it manifests.



Key



Citizen mentioned the factor



Public servant mentioned the factor

¹²⁷ The y axis reflects whether or not the respondent can control the mentioned factor, i.e. whether citizens can control the factors they mention, and whether public servants can control the factors they mention. For example, in the case of "Citizens report corruption," this was mentioned by public servants, not citizens, so this is considered to be a factor that the respondent (public servants) cannot control.




Figure 25. Spectrum of Citizens' Control Over Factors Related to Reporting Corruption

DOERS AND NON-DOERS MAY BE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLE

Another main finding from this research—and in particular from the quantitative data collection—is that **a picture has emerged of citizens who engage in corruption and those who don't as distinctly different types of people: people who are more concerned about being able to access the service are those who tend to pay bribes, for exactly this reason; on the other hand, people who are aware of the power of information may be those who tend to have it already and who already use it to good effect.** Citizens who refuse to pay bribes and report corruption are concerned with the morality of their behaviours, and are somewhat indifferent as to the practical consequences of their decisions, in terms of the time and effort required to access services. On the other hand, citizens who engage in corruption are more strictly focused on the here and now, and are more concerned about completing the service as quickly and efficiently as possible. In particular, the results reflect a discrepancy between the reasons that doers cite for refusing to pay a bribe, and the reasons that non-doers believe would convince them to adopt that behaviour, indicating a fundamental difference in the profiles of these two groups of people. Sometimes, there are external pressures that move people towards one end of the spectrum—such as needing a passport to access medical treatment abroad—but to a certain extent it seems that these characteristics may be inherent to the individual, an extension of their general attitude and outlook on life. As

this insight is primarily based on the quantitative research, given the limitations of that component of the study more research would be needed to confirm this.

REPORTING CORRUPTION AND REFUSING TO PAYING A BRIBE ARE NOT EQUALLY “CLEAN” OR “CORRUPT” BEHAVIOURS

The evidence from the research strongly indicates that the behaviours of “reporting corruption” and “refusing to pay a bribe”—the two main behaviours investigated through this study—are thought of differently by citizens. Paying a bribe is seen much more negatively than not reporting corruption, and reporting corruption is seen much more positively than refusing to pay a bribe (Figure 26). This helps to understand other findings in the research, such that there was more agreement among doers and non-doers that community laws and social rules supported reporting corruption, compared to the level of agreement that community laws and social rules supported refusing to pay a bribe; the latter is seen as more nuanced than reporting corruption, which is widely recognized as a behaviour that fights corruption. In addition, respondents purported to be highly critical of those who paid bribes—an actively corrupt behaviour—but far less so of those who did not report corruption, which is seen more as a neutral behaviour that has neither positive nor negative consequences; those who reported corruption were regarded positively, but not overly lauded given the rarity of this behaviour and the inherent

risks. The framework of empirical and normative expectations is useful to explain this point: both types of expectations exist for paying a bribe, i.e. citizens expect others to pay a bribe, and think that others will expect them to pay a bribe; on the other hand, neither type of expectations exist for reporting corruption, i.e. citizens do not think others will expect them to report corruption. Similarly, reporting corruption is seen as an extra step that people would have to go out of their way to do, whereas people would need to go out of their way to avoid paying a bribe, which is generally seen as the norm.




Figure 26. The Target Citizen Behaviours Along a Spectrum of Corruption

A citizen journey mapping research report

GLOSSARY




Kankor

The university entrance exam in Afghanistan

Tazkera

The national ID card in Afghanistan



ANNEX 1

Citizen Interview Questionnaire

BARRIER ANALYSIS – QUALITATIVE COMPONENT

Date: xxx

Duration: 30 – 60 minutes

Facilitator: xxx

Introduction: Salam! Our names are _____. We are researchers carrying out research for Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). The mission of Integrity Watch is to put corruption under the spotlight through community monitoring, research and advocacy. IWA collaborates with UNDP and is interested in your experiences and perception regarding corruption within the Afghan government. Whilst the results of this study will be public, we will keep confidential your names and your personal identifications.

Format: This session will last from 30 minutes to an hour. We'll ask questions about your general experience with accessing services and corruption, your thoughts on bribery and reporting corruption, and what other people in your community think and say about corruption.

First, we would like you to confirm your consent to participate in this research by signing this document.

Date:	
Place of Interview:	
Interview reference:	
Consent to participate in the research (yes/no)	
Signature	

Section A – General Experience with Accessing Services and Corruption

Interviewer: First, I'd like to ask you some questions about your general experience with accessing government services in Afghanistan

1. What government services have you personally accessed in the past 18 months from the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, or the court system? This could include obtaining documents, such as a tazkera, bringing a case to the courts, or another service.
2. Did you experience corruption while accessing any of these services? If so, in which services?
3. Please describe the different forms of corruption that you experienced.

Section B – Bribery

4. Under what sort of circumstances would you pay a bribe?
5. Under what sort of circumstances would you not pay a bribe?
6. Think of a situation in which you or someone you know considered not paying a bribe, but in the end decided to pay it. What would have been the consequences if you or the person you know had not paid the bribe?

Section C – Reporting Corruption

7. Under what sort of circumstances would you report corruption?
8. Who would you report it to exactly? Please explain why you would report it to them exactly.
9. Under what sort of circumstances would you not report corruption?
10. Think of a situation in which you or someone you know considered reporting corruption, but in the end decided not to. What would have had to be different in order for you or the person you know to have decided to report the corruption instead?

Service Provider Interview Questionnaire

BARRIER ANALYSIS – QUALITATIVE COMPONENT

Date: xxx

Duration: 1 hour

Facilitator: xxx

Introduction: Salam! Our names are _____. We are researchers carrying out research for Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). The mission of Integrity Watch is to put corruption under the spotlight through community monitoring, research and advocacy. IWA collaborates with UNDP and is interested in your experiences and perception regarding corruption within the Afghan government. Whilst the results of this study will be public, we will keep confidential your names and your personal identifications.

Format: This session will last about one hour. We'll ask questions about your previous jobs, your general thoughts on corruption, bribery in service provision, and norms and beliefs about corruption.

First, we would like you to confirm your consent to participate in this research by signing this document.

Date:	
Place of Interview:	
Interview reference:	
Consent to participate in the research (yes/no)	
Signature	

Section A – Previous Roles in Service Provision

1. Please describe the role(s) you've previously held and your responsibilities in those positions

Interviewer: For the following questions, please mention if any of the information you provide applies to one specific position, or to all your previous positions

2. What did you like about your job?
3. What did you not like about your job?
4. Describe your general interactions with your **managers** in the course of your duties. In particular, how were you treated? Would you say the interactions with managers were of good or bad quality? Please explain what made it difficult or easy to interact with managers.
5. Describe your general interactions with **citizens** in the course of your duties. In particular, how were you treated? Would you say the interactions were of good or bad quality? Please explain what made it difficult or easy to interact with citizens.

Section B – General Thoughts on Corruption

6. How would you define corruption?
7. How common do you think corruption is in Afghanistan? And especially during interactions between citizens and service providers for day to day procedures such as obtaining a tashkera, a driver's license, etc?
8. What do you personally think about corruption?
9. What impact does corruption have on society in your views? And on service providers' interactions with citizens?
10. What do you think is the most common form of corruption among service providers?
11. Do you sometimes hear about corruption in the media? If yes, what have you heard in the media recently about corruption? What did you think of it?

12. Who are some people or institutions in Afghanistan that you admire or look up to? Why do you admire them?

Section C – Bribery in Government Service Provision

13. A lot of citizens say that they are often asked for bribes when accessing government services. Why do you think service providers ask them for bribes?

14. Under what sort of circumstances would a service provider ask for a bribe in general? Are there specific services or circumstances where this is more frequent?

15. How do factors—such as the office environment, the supervisor, and citizens' awareness of the process – affect the decision to ask for a bribe?

16. In your opinion, what kind of service provider would be most likely to ask for a bribe? What makes it more likely?

17. What would be the advantages of asking for a bribe?

18. What would be the disadvantages of asking for a bribe?

19. Some people think that service providers should be punished for asking for bribes or asking for personal favours. What do you think about this?

20. How do you think a service provider feels when they ask a citizen for a bribe?

21. Under what sort of circumstances would a service provider not ask for a bribe?

22. What sort of factors would discourage a service provider from asking for a bribe?

23. In your opinion, what kind of person would be most likely to pay a bribe? What makes it more likely?

24. How do you think citizens feel when they are asked to pay a bribe?

25. Do you think efforts should be made to curb corruption in government services in Afghanistan? If yes/no, why?

26. Who do you think is responsible for addressing corruption in Afghanistan? Who do you think has enough power to address corruption at all the levels, even petty corruption?

Section D – Norms and Beliefs

27. What do service providers think of other service providers who ask for bribes?

28. What do service providers think of other service providers who don't ask for bribes?

29. Among service providers, is it well-known and accepted that bribery takes place? Or is this not discussed at all?

30. Do you think engaging in corruption is aligned with your religious beliefs?


31. Do you think engaging in corruption is aligned with Afghan culture?

Profiles of Respondent:

Name of respondent:								
Place of residence:								
Civil status:								
Age:								
Gender:								
Education:								
Ethnic Group:								
Occupation:								
Tel number:								

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